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QUESTIONS
1.

Does

the

Takings

PRESENTED
Clause

authorize

a court

to

invalidate
state rent control or land use regulatory
legislation on its face, without regard to whether it diminishes
economic value or use or causes any physical invasion of
the plaintiff's property, when
statute does not substantially
pose?
2.

Does

the

facial

the court concludes
that the
advance a legislative
pur-

constitutional

validity

legislation
depend
on whether
a federal
that it will achieve its objective?

court

of

state

predicts

ii
PARTIES
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PROCEEDINGS

The parties to the proceedings
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below
for his predecessor
as Attorney
General, Margery
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OPINIONS
The

opinion

BELOW

of the Court

of Appeals

for the Ninth

,'ircuit is reported
at 224 F.3d 1030, and is reprinted
in
he appendix
hereto, App. 1, below. The opinion of the
)istrict Court granting
Jdgment
is reported

respondent's
motion for summary
at 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (D. Haw.

998) and

at App,

is reprinted

43.

.0

JURISDICTION
The

Ninth

Circuit

entered

its judgment

and opinion

.n September
13, 2000. Petitioner
filed timely petitions
or reconsideration
and for reconsideration
en banc on
eptember 27, 2000. The Ninth Circuit
ions on October 26, 2000 and entered
.n October

31, 2000. App.

The jurisdiction
f the Ninth Circuit

denied these petian amended order

69-72.

of this Court to review the decision
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
._.

CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTE
The Fifth Amendment

PROVISIONS
INVOLVED

to the Constitution

provides

in

elevant part: "No person shall be . . . deprived
of life,
tberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall
.rivate property
be taken for public use, without
iust
ompensation."

The Fourteenth

Amendment

provides,

in

ection 1: "[NJor shall any State deprive
any person of
.fe, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within
tection of the laws."

its jurisdiction

the equal

The relevant
portion
of Act 257, Haw.
§ 486H-10.4 (1997), is reprinted at App. 73.

pro-

Rev. Star.

#
STATEMENT

OF THE CASE

Hawaii enacted Act 257 in 1997 to try to temper the
State's relatively high retail price of gasoline.
Haw. Rev.
Star. § 486H-10.4. The Act limits the amount of rent that
oil distributors
may charge gasoline
retailers who lease
company-owned
filling stations
to 15% of gross profit
from gasoline sales and of gross revenue from sale of
other products.
Chevron
owns 64 stations
in Hawaii,
which it leases to operators who sell Chevron gasoline at
retail.
Chevron

filed suit in the United

for the District of Hawaii
ney General of Hawaii,

States District

Court

against the Governor and Attorclaiming
that Act 257 facially

effects an unconstitutional
regulatory
taking and seeking
declaratory
relief. Chevron moved for summary
judgment, advancing
several arguments.
The District Court
granted Chevron's motion, holding that the act constituted a regulatory
taking because it failed to substantially
advance a legitimate
government
interest.
The District
law was intended

Court

found

that the station

to be and was logically

rent control
related

to the

legitimate
purpose
of reducing
retail gasoline
prices.
App. 55-56. But the Court understood
itself to be bound
by the precedents

of the Ninth

Circuit

and of this Court

to apply a higher standard
of scrutiny, captured
in the
phrase "substantially
advance"
a legitimate
government
interest. The Court reasoned
that since the Act did not
regulate

the sale of a station

lease

by an operator,

the

lessee could capture
a "premium"
in the sale price,
reflecting the difference
between the regulated
and market rents, and thus could defeat the goal of holding down
gasoline
prices. The Court also concluded,
somewhat
inconsistently,
that
premium),
because

there would be no savings (and no
Chevron
could recover lost rent by

raising the price it charged the operator for gasoline. The
District Court expressly rejected the State's argument
that
the proper standard
of review was whether
the legislature reasonably
could have believed
that the statute
would hold down retail gasoline prices. App. 52-54.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the District
Court had applied the correct standard
but vacated the
grant of summary judgment
and remanded
for trial. The
Court of Appeals, too, rejected the State's argument
that
the validity of a land use ordinance should be evaluated
under the traditional
standard of the due process clause,
"whether
'the Legislature
rationally
could have believed
the Act would substantially
advance a legitimate
government purpose.'"
App. 6. The Court felt itself bound by
circuit precedent,
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (gth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
871 (1998). The Court interpreted
"substantially
advance"
to "depend[ ] on whether it will in fact lead to lower fuel
prices." App. 24-25. Finding that the affidavits
relied on
by the trial court did not clearly resolve this question, the
Court of Appeals remanded
for a trial. It recognized
that
the inquiry would deal with "questions of predictive
fact,

rather
found

than historical fact."
that the legislation

App. 18. The Court expressly
does not deprive
Chevron's

property of economic viability, noting that the legislation
allows it to charge "more than it would otherwise
have
charged under its own rental program."
App. 25.
Judge William Fletcher concurred
in the result but
disagreed
with the majority's
analysis. App. 28. Within
the constraints
of circuit precedent,
he argued that the
court should have applied the more lenient due process
standard
of reasonableness
previously
applied
to rent
and price control legislation.
App. 28, 37. He concluded:
I fear that under the majority opinion virtually
all rent control laws in the Ninth Circuit are
now subject to the "substantially
advances
a
legitimate
state interest" test, and that this test
may invalidate many of these laws ....
The
question
before
the judiciary
is not the
advisability
of rent control laws but rather their
constitutionality.
Ever since its retreat from economic substantive
due process at the end of the
1930s, the Supreme Court has essentially
left it
to the other
branches
of government
to
decide . . . whether to adopt rent and price
controls."
App. 40-41.

REASONS
I.

FOR

GRANTING

THE

WRIT

The Ninth Circuit's
Rule That the Validity
of Property
Regulation
be Analyzed
Under
the Takings
Clause
Raises
an Important
Issue Which
This Court
has Recognized
as Unsettled
and
Conflicts
with
Decisions
of Federal
Claims

by

that

Takings

a
its

outside

nally

relate

however,

under

the

the Ninth

rationality

only may but must
rather

than

Ninth

Circuit

under
has

state

Due

Circuit

and

has

be analyzed
made

that

long

land
under
that

that
use

the

to ratiohave

Since

been
1996,

challenges
regulation

the Takings

Clause.

by

legislation

purpose,

Process

it clear

state

Clause.

or

invoke

it fails

insisted

of

an owner,

because

Process

validity
the Due

from
invasion

properly

claims

power,

to a legitimate

considered

property

viability,

police

and by the Court

physical

By contrast,

the

Courts

takes

permanent

economic

Clause.

falls

Supreme

legislation

authorizing

destroying

the

by State
Claims.

Clause,

1 Moreover,

it will apply

to
not
the

a higher

1 Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
Indeed,
the Ninth
Circuit
interpreted
this Court's
decision in Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), to mean that
the "constitutional
bar on "private takings" preempts
[more
generalized]
substantive
due process claim[s]." Armendariz, 75
F.3d at 1322. Thus, challenges
to the validity
of land use
ordinances
may be brought
only under the Takings Clause.
Other circuits have rejected this view, e.g., John Corp. v. City of
Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 583 (Sth Cir. 2000), and it has been
severely criticized.
See Toni Massaro, Reviving Hugo Black? The
Court's "]or For Jot" Account of Substantive Due Process, 73 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 1086, 1100-03 (1998). This collateral
issue would
disappear
if this Court held, as it should, that challenges
to the
reasonableness
of legislation
may not be brought
under the
Takings Clause.

6

standard
of scrutiny
when it reviews state legislation
under the Takings Clause than it would under the Due
Process Clause, although
it has never presented any principled justification
for this much
State democratic
decision making.
sion concerning
prompt

core

greater intrusion
into
Such error and confu-

constitutional

provisions

require

cure by this Court.

In this case,

the court

below

held that

Hawaii's

Act

257 must be found to violate the Takings Clause if the
trial court finds that it will not "substantially
advance"
the state's

legitimate

purpose

of reducing

of gasoline. The Ninth Circuit's
that court to use of the Takings

the retail price

decision clearly commits
Clause for second guess-

ing the wisdom of virtually
all state and local legislation
regulating
land, bringing
doctrinal
confusion in this area
to an appalling level and endangering
the relationship
between federal courts and state governments.
This Court
needs to resolve this confusion
and restore the appropriate and traditional
deference
that federal courts show
state
lems.

legislation
This Court

addressing

social

has not authoritatively

and

economic
resolved

probwhether

challenges to the means - ends rationality of legislation
may be resolved under the Takings Clause. Indeed, contradictory
indications
by the Court may have fostered the
confusion
that now reigns in the lower courts, making
timely guidance from this Court particularly
appropriate.
Of course, this Court authored
the long line of cases
establishing
that arbitrary
legislation
violates due process. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365,
395 (1926). The confusion
stems from Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), where the Court, while

unanimously

upholding

a large

lot zoning

ordinance

against a facial challenge,
stated that a taking occurs
where the law "does not substantially
advance legitimate
state interests."
For that proposition,
the Agins opinion,
issued near the end of the 1979 Term, cites only a due
process decision, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183,
188 (1928). Although
the Court has quoted Agins subsequently, it neither
has explained
its meaning
nor ever
struck down a regulation as a taking for failing this test.
It is high time the Court clarify that the Agins formulation
amounts
only to inadvertent
dicta.
The Court

has given

several

indications

that

it is

ready to do so. Indeed, in Eastern Enterprises v. ApfeI, 524
U.S. 498 (1998), even though the Court struck down retroactive health care liability legislation,
five justices stated
that questions about the legitimacy of economic legislation should be addressed
under the Due Process, rather
than under the Takings Clause. Id. at 545-6 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring);
id. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy explicitly noted the "uneasy
tension" between his
view and the Agins test. Id. at 545. He concluded:
"Given
that the constitutionality
of the Coal Act appears to turn
on the legitimacy of the Congress'
judgment
rather than
on the availability
of compensation
. . . the more appropriate constitutional
analysis arises under general due
process principles rather than under the Takings Clause."
Id. Justice Breyer, for four dissenters,
wrote, "As this
language [of the Takings
the Clause lies a concern,

Clause] suggests, at the heart of
not with preventing arbitrary or

unfair government
action, but with providing
compensation for legitimate
government
action that takes 'private
property' to serve the 'public' good." Id. at 554 (emphasis

8

in original).

Even if these congruent

conclusions

from five

justices
do not technically
constitute
a holding
with
which the Ninth Circuit is in conflict, it does indicate that
a majority
below.

of the Court

rejects the linchpin

of the decision

The Court also raised but expressly
did not settle the
appropriateness
of the "substantially
advance"
test for a
takings challenge in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes of
Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999). In Del Monte
Dunes, the Court affirmed liability based on an instruction permitting
the jury to decide whether
denial of a
permit related to a legislative
interest, without deciding
whether the Takings Clause authorized
such an instruction, because the defendant
had explicitly
agreed to the
instruction.
In this case, by contrast, defendants
contested
the standard for review in both the Court of Appeals and
the District Court. App. 6, 52. In addition
to the Court,
the authors of the separate
opinions
went out of their
ways to "express no view;" Del Monte Dunes at 732 n.2
(Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring
in the judgment), and "offer no opinion," id. at 753 n.12 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting
in part), about whether
the Agins test was correct. Plainly, the justices view this
question as open and timely.
Del Monte Dunes also made clear the important
analytical distinction
between exaction cases and regulation
cases. The Court has required that transfers
of physical
possession
or ownership
from a private
owner to the
government
in exchange
for approval
of a development
plan, referred to generally
as exactions,
both "substantially
goals

advance"
and
of the relevant

be "roughly
proportional"
to the
legislation.
Dolan v. City of Tigard,

512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987). But these cases address the discreet
and sensitive
question
effect an actual physical

of when a permit condition
occupation without resulting

can
in a

taking and have no logical bearing on when a regulation
becomes so burdensome
as to effect a taking. The Court
confirmed in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999), that the rough
proportionality
test of Dolan had been fashioned
for exactions and had no role in assessing

regulations

of use. The

same logic requires the conclusion
that the substantially
advance test of Nollan has no role in reviewing
a regulation. Without the transfer of physical possession
there is
neither need nor justification for a higher level of scrutiny of the state's reason for its action. Thus, in another
useful way, the Court
below.

recently

has shed light on the error

In sum, all nine justices recently have authored
or
joined opinions admitting the need for clarification
of this
important
issue. Thus, the Court has identified
and
framed the question here cleanly presented,
an unusually compelling case for the grant

making this
of certiorari.

The Ninth Circuit's approach directly conflicts with
decisions by the Rhode Island and Washington
Supreme
Courts squarely holding that challenges to the rationality
of land use regulation must be brought under the Due
Process, not the Takings Clause. Brunelle v. Town of South
Kingston, 700 A.2d 1075, 1083-84 n.5 (R.I. 1997) ("IT]he
arbitrariness
or capriciousness
of a particular state action
is properly
examined
under the light of the Fourteenth
Amendment
due process clause and not the Fifth Amendment

takings

clause.");

Mission

Springs

Inc. v. City of

10

Spokane, 954 P.2d 250, 258 (Wash. 1998). No doubt more
courts would be in conflict with the decision if they did
not feel bound

by the Court's

pronouncement

in Agins.

The Ninth Circuit rule also squarely conflicts with a
long line of decisions by the United States Court of Federal Claims, which has jurisdiction
over all takings claims
for just compensation
against the United States under the
Tucker Act. That Court has consistently
held that challenges as to whether legislation
"substantially
a government
interest cannot be entertained

advances"
under the

Takings Clause and fall outside that court's jurisdiction.
Bamber v. United States, 45 Fed. CI. 162, 165 (1999); Florida
Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States, 45 Fed. C1. 21, 42
(1999); Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 15 CI. Ct. 381,
390 (1988), aff'd, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("[N]o court
has ever found a taking has occurred
solely because a
state interest was not legitimately
advanced
. . . "). The
Claims Court's refusal to hear challenges
to the validity
of federal legislation
may reflect its sensitivity
to limitations on the liability of the United States under the Tucker
Act.
The confusion
below extends beyond these direct
conflicts as lower courts have struggled
to make sense of
the Court's
inconclusive
statements.
In Santa Monica
Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 968 P.2d 993 (Cal.

1999),

where the California Supreme Court upheld a rent control ordinance against a facial takings challenge, Justice
Kennard explicitly
requested
confusion sown by Agins:

this

Court

to resolve

[R]ecently, Justice Kennedy of the United States
Supreme Court has questioned
the appropriateness of using a means ends test as the measure

the

11
of whether a taking has occurred
the Nollan/Dolan context, should

....
Outside
a means-ends

test be used to determine
whether a taking has
occurred,
or instead should means end testing
remain within due process jurisprudence?
Only
the high court can resolve this question and,
given the importance
of this area of law, I
respectfully
suggest that it do so when the
opportunity
next arises.
ld. at 1012-13 (Kennard, J., concurring).2
See also John Corp
v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 579 n.9 (5th Cir. 2000)
(avoiding "knotty issue" of whether claim that government action failed to advance a public purpose should be
brought under Due Process or Takings Clause). Commentators have argued for years that it is anomalous
to test
the validity
Echeverria,

of legislation
under the Takings Clause. John
Takings and Errors, 51 Ala. L. Rev. 1047 (2000);

Jerold Kayden, Land Use, Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nonan
Invitation, 23 Urb.
Law. 301 (1991).
The Ninth Circuit's
insistence
on testing the rationality
of state legislation
under the Takings
Clause
plunges litigants into a host of logical and practical problems. Certainly,
the most harmful
effect has been the
heightened
level of scrutiny applied to economic
legislation just because land is the asset being regulated.
The
2 Justice Brown, who dissented, echoed the plea of Justice
Kennard: "If such measures [i.e., rent control ordinances] are
capable of withstanding
a Nollan-inspired
takings clause
analysis, the high court ought to tell us so, probably sooner
rather than later." Santa Monica Beach, Ltd., supra, 968 P.2d at
1047.

12

difference in standard
between regulation
of land and of
other contractual
or property
assets seems particularly
indefensible
in this case, where Chevron both leases land
and sells gasoline to the retailer. Hawaii's
regulation
of
rent is subject to demanding
review under the Takings
Clause, but a regulation
of wholesale
gasoline prices
would be considered
under the more generous
standard
of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Permian Basin Area
Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1968). No reasoned justification for decreasing
dramatically
the scope of legislative discretion
to regulate
commercial
real estate as
opposed
to other business
assets has ever been offered.
We address this issue at length below under the heading
of the next argument.
The Due Process

Clause

serves

as a substantive

limit

on governmental
power; laws found in violation
generally are held invalid. The Takings Clause, by contrast, "is
designed
not to limit governmental
interference
with
property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in
the event of otherwise
proper interference
amounting
to a
taking." First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987) (emphasis
in
original).
Legislation
challenged
as invalid may impose
quite minor burdens on a property owner, as the Ninth
Circuit found was the case here, App. 25, which in no
way resemble the severe losses targeted by the Takings
Clause. Arbitrary
legislation
does not raise the fundamental question of whether it forces "some people alone
to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice
should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Arbitrary
imposes burdens
that no one should bear.

legislation
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Entertaining
under

challenges

the Takings

to the validity

Clause

raises

about remedy. The constitutionally

of legislation

perplexing
required

questions
remedy

for a

regulatory taking is an award of just compensation.
First
English, supra, 482 U.S. 314-22. But it is difficult to understand

what

constitutes

"just

compensation"

when

the

fault of the law is that it does not achieve its objectives,
since this fault bears no economic
relationship
to the
property

owner's

loss, if any.

Respondents
here sued
But this Court has repeatedly
is not

available

to enjoin

seeking
declaratory
held that "[e]quitable
an alleged

taking

relief.
relief

of private

property for public use, duly authorized
by law, when a
suit for compensation
can be brought against the sovereign subsequent
to the taking."
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); see also Presault v. ICC, 494
U.S. 1, 11-17 (1990). The plurality
in Eastern Enterprises,
supra, strove to fashion an exception to this rule when the
payment
sensical,
need

of compensation
by government
would be nonas it would be here, 524 U.S. at 519-22, but the

to improvise

such

an exception

and its uncertain

scope suggest the continuing
problems
of jamming
square pegs in round holes. Similarly, some courts have
limited

plaintiffs'

"temporary

statute has been held invalid
damages
based on "actual

takings"

damages,

after a

under the Takings Clause, to
losses,"
the measure
that

would have been used if the case had been brought under
the Due Process Clause, rather than "compensation
for
the period

during

which

the taking

was effective."

First

English, supra, 482 U.S. at 321. See, e.g., Corrigan v. City of
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Scottsdale,

720 P. 2d 513, 518-19

pensation

often

Moreover,

because

benefit

from

would
the

arbitrary

compensation

tant

The issue presented
that the Court
can

ment
United

rule

regulation
States

confer
public,
legislation,

for

Circuit's

by

(Ariz.

taxpayers

subjects

to illogical

windfalls
by

land
and

Paying
on

definition,
the

com-

owners.
does

fairness

3
not

argument

fails. 4

here is among
resolve
at this

virtually

touching

1986).

all state
in the

the most importime. The Ninth
and

western

unjustifiably

local
third

intense

governof the
judicial

3 In Tampa-Hillsborough
County Expressway Authority v.
A.G.W.S. Corp., 640 So.2d 54 (Fla. 1994), the Florida Supreme
Court initially had held that the state highway
department's
authority to mark the location of future roads on an official map
constituted
a taking because it did not advance
a legitimate
state interest.
After
trial courts
began
to permit
affected
property
owners
jury trials on compensation
for temporary
takings, with no preliminary
showing
of any economic
injury,
the Court changed the doctrinal basis for its invalidation
to the
Due Process Clause
to limit indemnification
to those who
actually

suffered

damage.

4 The Ninth Circuit also has felt compelled
to create an
exception
from the finality rules of Williamson County Regional
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985) for regulatory
takings
claims
brought
under
the
"substantially
advance"
rubric. Because such claims do not
depend
on how much economic
value is left in the plaintiff's
property or the extent to which it has been compensated,
but on
the effectiveness
of the legislation,
they are considered
immediately
ripe. Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 123
F.3d 1150, 1165 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998).
This exception
further
demonstrates
the illogic of addressing
issues of validity under a constitutional
provision
concerned
with compensation
for what the government
takes away for
valid reasons.
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second-guessing,
fomenting
tion under a fundamentally

extensive,
expensive
litigaincoherent
constitutional

doctrine. This Court should take responsibility
for clearing up this dangerous
confusion,
having recognized
that
Agins is problematic
and is creating havoc in the lower
courts. This Court can save all lower courts from troublesome confusion and wasted effort by now making it clear
that challenges
to the means ends rationality
of legislation should be brought under the Due Process and not the
Takings Clause.

II.

The Ninth Circuit Adopted
a Standard
of Review
That Requires
Courts to Evaluate
the Wisdom
of
State Legislation
Contrary to Fundamental
Constitutional Principles
and in Conflict
with the Decisions of Other Federal Courts of Appeal and State
Supreme
Courts.

Whether challenges
to the validity
of state land use
regulation are adjudicated
under the Due Process Clause,
as we urge, or under the Takings Clause, the standard of
review is crucial to maintaining
a proper balance between
democratic
governance
and the rule of law. Since at least
the 1930's, this Court generally has employed
a rational
relationship
test for Due Process and Equal Protection
Clause challenges
to social and economic
legislation.
Under this test, the Court upholds legislation that a rational legislator could have believed would advance a permissible public purpose.
E.g., WilIiamson v. Lee Optical,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955). The Court
has exercised
"strict scrutiny" in cases where legislation
touches upon
certain "fundamental
interests,"
so that the legislation
will be held invalid unless the state can show that it is

16

necessary

to advance

a compelling

state

interest.

E.g.,

Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977)
(occupancy statute struck down for burdening
interests of
members
of extended
family in living together).
Some
few cases may fall in an intermediate
category, where the
interests affected are unusually
important
but not fundamental and where a tighter fit between means and ends
must be demonstrated
than in rational basis cases. See
e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432
(1985). Although the Court has divided over how to
determine
which interests require a higher level of scrutiny, this basic structure
has been remarkably
consistent.
Land use regulation
and economic regulation

has long been considered
social
subject to rational basis scrutiny.

Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926). And
the validity of rent control laws, when not confiscatory,
has been subject to invalidation
only when "arbitrary;
discriminatory,
or demonstrably
irrelevant
to the policy
the legislature
is free to adopt." Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1, 11 (1988). Experts dispute whether or under
what conditions
rent control laws are efficacious.
But the
wisdom of this long line of cases is that the usefulness
of
a rent control or other land use laws is a question
that
should be decided
by the people through
representatives
and not by judges.
In this case, the Ninth

Circuit

their

elected

held that Act 257 must

"substantially
advance"
the public interest, that legislation "substantially
advances"
an interest
if it "bears a
reasonable
relationship"
to that interest,
and that
"[w}hether Act 257's rent cap is reasonably
related to its
objective of lowering
fuel prices certainly
depends
on
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whether it will in fact lead to lower
This standard affords the decision
ture no deference at all. It instructs
the statute if, based upon testimony
tive facts," a telling oxymoron,
he

fuel prices." op at 14.
of the Hawaii legislathe trial judge to void
concerning
"predicpredicts
that the Act

will not work. This Court should not permit lower federal
courts to exercise such supervisory
power over the merits
of state legislative decisions. Such a judicial role resembles far too closely that prevalent during the discredited
Lochner era, when courts struck down maximum
hour
legislation
because they did not think that it would protect the health of workers or minimum
wage legislation
because they did not think it would improve
the economic position of workers. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S,
45 (1905); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
The

court

below

should

have

instructed

the

trial

court to uphold Act 257 only if there is no possibility
that
it can achieve a lawful objective.
"[W]hether
in fact the
provision
will accomplish
its objectives
is not the question: the [constitutional
requirement]
is satisfied
if . . . the . . . [state] Legislature
rationally could have
believed that the [Act] would
promote
its objective."
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242
(1984) quoting Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd.
of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981) (emphasis
in
original). 5 It is bedrock constitutional
law, that "[e]ven if

s The Ninth Circuit argues that Midkiff is irrelevant,
because a lower standard of rationality is appropriate in a case
involving expropriation
and payment
of compensation.
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 E3d 1150, 1158
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 871 (1998). This argument is
weak. First, it ignores that the Midkiff Court expressly equated
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the wisdom of the policy be regarded as debatable
effects uncertain,
still the legislature
is entitled

and its
to its

judgment."
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937). In this case, the district court held that providing a
flexible maximum
rent logically aimed at reducing
gasoline prices
(App.
55-6), but did not substantially
advance that goal, making clear that the court used a
raised standard.
Both the District Court and Ninth Circuit
explicitly rejected Hawaii's
argument
that the lower, traditional level of scrutiny should be used. App. 6-7, 52-54.
But this Court long ago stated the correct view:
"Whether
the enactment
is wise or unwise,
whether it is based on sound economic theory,
whether
it is the best means to achieve
the
desired result, whether,
in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed
limits should be
exercised in a particular
manner, are matters for
the iudgment
of the legislature,
and the earnest
conflict of serious opinion
does not suffice to
bring them within the range of judicial cognizance." Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219
U.S. 549, 569 (1911).
Federal court scrutiny of state social and economic
legislation at this level of intrusiveness,
not only violates
the scope of the legislature's
discretion under the eminent
domain power with that under the police power, 467 U.S. at 240.
Second, the argument illogically advocates a higher level of
scrutiny for the validity of legislation
having a smaller
interference with the owner's control of his property. Chief
Justice Rehnquist has argued that Midkiff provides the right
standard
for assessing
regulatory
legislation.
Keystone
Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictfs, 480 U.S. 470, 511 n.3
(1987) (dissenting opinion).
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long

accepted

understandings

of the

distinct

roles

of

judges and elected representatives,
it tramples on important virtues of federalism.
The sovereign
powers of the
states can be impaired as surely by federal judges wielding expansive interpretations
of vague constitutional
provisions
as by Congress
passing
the limits
on its
enumerated
powers or commandeering
state agencies, as
in, for example,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
The Court wisely has long heeded the admonition
of
Justice Brandeis that open-ended
review under the Fourteenth Amendment
poses a special threat when a state
may "serve as a laboratory"
trying "novel social and
economic
experiments,"
because
broad,
non-textual
review makes it easy to "erect our prejudices
into legal
principles."
New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 280,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
State experimentation simply is not possible
if a federal judge has the
authority
to decide, on the basis of expert
testimony
about "predictive
facts," whether a new state law "will in
fact lead to lower fuel prices." App. 25. This approaches
placing a state legislature
into federal receivership.
The Ninth Circuit has not offered any reasoned justification for imposing a more demanding
standard on land
use or rent control regulation.
The court below followed
its own Richardson precedent,
also striking down a rent
control provision,
which mechanically
quoted the "substantially
advance"
language
from Agins and drew an
expansive
command
from this Court's decision in Yee v.
City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). In Yee, the Court did
suggest in dicta that rent control laws could be amenable
to the "substantially
advance"
test restated in Nollan v.
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California

Coastal

Commission,

such authority
hardly justifies
of efficacy directed here. First,
quite deferential
standard,
nexus" between a regulation
by the District Court to be

483

U.S.

825 (1987),

but

the intrusive measurement
Nollan actually employed a
requiring
only a "logical
and goal, something
found
present
here. App. 55-56.

Moreover,
to the extent Nollan requires greater scrutiny,
DeI Monte Dunes has made it apparent
that Nollan applies
only to permanent
physical occupations,
not mere regulations, as explained
above, at 9.
Yee also suggested
that the ability
capture the difference between regulated
rent in conveying his leasehold
have some bearing" on whether

of a tenant to
rent and market

to a new tenant "might
the ordinance
was valid.

503 U.S. at 530. Hawaii does not dispute
that lessees'
capture of regulatory
savings
should be considered
in
assessing
the rationality
of the statute. But Yee nowhere
even hints that the ability of a lessee to convey his interest ipso facto elevates the scrutiny to which the statute is
subject or casts onto
ordinance will work.

the state

a duty

to prove

that

the

The Ninth Circuit explicitly
ruled that all land use
regulation
must meet this test. Its decisions stand in stark
conflict with many decisions in other circuits employing
a
highly deferential
standard
in Due Process challenges to
state and local government
land use regulations,
including rent control ordinances.
The Fourth Circuit, for exampie, has stated

that

challenges

to land

use laws

"can

survive only if the alleged purpose
behind the state
action has no conceivable
rational
relationship
to the
exercise of the state's traditional
police power through
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zoning." Sylvia Developmen! Corp. v. Calvert County, Maryland, 48 F.3d 810, 827 (4th Cir. 1995}. The Seventh Circuit
even requires a property owner to show that an adverse
zoning decision not only is arbitrary and irrational, but
also show the violation of another constitutional
right or
that state law does not provide an adequate remedy. New
Burnham Prairie Homes v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474,
1481 (7th Cir. 1990). It would be difficult to overstate
the
aversion of most lower federal courts
review of local land use decisions under

to open-ended
standards
such

as endorsed by the Ninth Circuit here. See, e.g., RRI Realty
Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Southhampton, 870 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1989) (refusing to entertain
substantive
due process challenge to denial of permit unless plaintiff preliminarily can show an entitlement
to it under state law).
The Ninth Circuit's ruling also conflicts directly with
important recent decisions by the highest courts of California and New York interpreting
the Agins "substantially
advance" formula so as to preserve traditional
legislative
discretion.
In Santa Monica Beach, supra, the California
Supreme Court sustained
the granting of a demurrer
to a
takings challenge to a city rent control law, where the
plaintiff wished to try to show that the law failed to
achieve its goals, the factual inquiry ordered by the Ninth
Circuit in this case. The Court stated: "In sum, with rent
control,
as with most other such social and economic
legislation,
we leave to legislative
bodies rather than to
the courts to evaluate whether the legislation has fallen
so far short of its goals as to warrant repeal or amendment." 968 P.2d at 1007. The conflict over respective
willingness to second guess legislation between the Ninth
Circuit and the California
Supreme Court will draw

22

floods of litigants into federal as opposed
in our largest state. Similarly, the New
Appeals, in "easily" sustaining
a town's
ments, held that the Agins means-ends
that land use laws bear a "reasonable

to state courts
York Court of
zoning amend-

test only requires
relationship"
to

legitimate
objectives, an approach
indistinguishable
from
traditional
due process analysis. Bonnie Briar Syndicate v.
Mamaroneck, 721 N.E. 2d 971 (N.Y. 1999).
Justice Kennedy recently lamented
that "It]he imprecision of our regulatory
takings doctrine does open the
door to normative
considerations
about the wisdom of
government
decisions."
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 539, 545 (Kennedy,
J., concurring
in part and
dissenting
in part). This is a case where the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
requires
federal
courts to strike
down legislation
when it concludes
that elected legislators have made an unwise estimate of the benefits of
legislation.
This Court
rect balance between
political processes.
Ill.

urgently needs
federal judicial

to restore the corpower and state

Review Should
Be Granted Because This Case
sents an Important
and Clear-Cut
Issue That
Present Consequences
for States in the Ninth
cuit and Will Control
Further
Conduct
of

PreHas
CirThis

Case.

The Court should
though the Ninth Circuit
Circuit has clearly and
dard to be applied, and
in this case. Subsequent
the need

to defend

grant review in this
remanded
for a trial.
finally established
the
it is cleanly presented
litigation will subject

the wisdom

of its legislation

case, even
The Ninth
legal stanfor review
Hawaii to
and the
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prescience of its legislators.
As in United States v. General
Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945), another
takings case
where the Court of Appeals had remanded
for trial under
a troubling legal standard,
the decision below is "fundamental to the further conduct of the case." See also Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153 (1964).
That
numerous

the standard
adopted
below
conflicts
with
decision of this and other courts, as we show

above, provides further reason for immediate
review. Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1897);
accord, General Motors, 323 U.S. at 374; Michael v. United
States, 454 U.S. 950, 951 (1981)

(White,

J., dissenting).

Most importantly,
the issue is important
and has
present
consequences
for Hawaii
and other states.
Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997). The
Ninth Circuit rule subjects
land use and rent control
legislation
over the western
part of the United States to
intrusive federal court oversight in violation of principles
of both separation
of powers and federalism.
As a result,
it invites a plethora of inappropriate
and expensive litigation challenging
the efficacy of many state and local laws.
The lower courts struggle in present confusion about the
governing
principles.
The Court would not serve well
either the states or the lower courts to postpone decision
on these issues until the conclusion of trial and further
appeal

in this case.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons
should be granted.
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OPINION
BEEZER, Circuit

Judge:

Hawaii Governor
Benjamin J. Cayetano
and Attorney
General Earl I. Anzai (collectively
"the State") appeal the
district court's judgment
in favor of Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
Chevron
filed suit for declaratory
and injunctive
relief
against enforcement
of Section 3(c) of Act 257 of the 1997
Hawaii State Legislature
("Act 257"). Act 257, inter alia,
proscribes the maximum
rent that oil companies
can collect from dealers who lease company-owned
service stations. Both parties
moved
for summary
judgment
on
whether the maximum
permissible
regulated
rent effects
an unconstitutional
regulatory
taking. After concluding
that it does, the district court granted
Chevron's
motion
and denied the State's motion. The State appeals only the
grant of summary
judgment
to Chevron;
it does not
appeal the denial of its own motion. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because genuine issues of material fact exist, we vacate the judgment
and remand for
further proceedings.
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I
In response
trated

gasoline

to concerns
market

about

in Hawaii

the

highly

concen-

and the resulting

high

cost of gasoline to consumers,
the Hawaii Legislature
enacted Act 257 on June 21, 19973 Act 257, inter alia,
regulates the maximum rent an oil company
dealers who lease its service stations.

can charge

Chevron is one of two gasoline refiners and one of six
wholesalers
in Hawaii. At the retail level, Chevron sells
most of its gasoline

through

which are leased to independent
64 service stations to dealers
through
gasoline

company-owned

stations,

dealers. Chevron leases
in Hawaii.
From 1984

the end of 1996, Chevron
relied on estimated
sales to calculate the rent owed by the lessee

dealers.

After determining

receipts

was

that the amount

not satisfactor);

Chevron

of gross

initiated

rent

a new

nationwide
dealer rental program in January 1997. Chevron restructured
the manner in which it calculated
lease
rates. This program,
effect in Hawaii

which

absent

the parties

Act 257, requires

agree would

be in

the lessee dealer

to pay a monthly rent, consisting of an escalating percentage of the dealer's
gross margin on actual, rather than
estimated,

gasoline

sales.

For instance,

calculated

as 18% of the gross margin

the rent would

be

up to $18,000; 32%

of the portion between $18,q00and $28,000; and 38% of
the portion over $28,000. In contrast, Act 257 establishes
a
maximum

regulated

rent of 15% of gross

margin.

i The relevant portions of Act 257 were later codified as
Hawaii Revised Statute § 486H-10.4.

App. 4
The maximum
rents Chevron projects it could receive
under the statutory
scheme imposed by Act 257 totals
$6,126,646 for 1998. Chevron's
projected
expenses
total
$6,292,855, exceeding
Chevron's
projected
rental income
by $166,209.

Chevron

concedes,

however,

that

it has not

fully recovered its expenses relating to dealer stations
(including
ground lease rents, real property
taxes, ordinary maintenance
and depreciation)
state in the last 20 years.
Instead,

Chevron

from

relies on supply

rent

contracts

in any

to earn a

profit. Dealers who choose to rent a station from Chevron
must, as a condition
of their lease, agree to purchase from
Chevron all of the fuel necessary to satisfy demand at
that station

for Chevron

gasoline.

The price under

the

supply contract is unilaterally
set by Chevron.
Both the
lease agreement
and the supply contract
permit the
dealer to transfer his or her occupancy
rights upon
obtaining Chevron's
written consent and paying a transfer fee set by Chevron. Act 257 does not prohibit such
transfers.
In conjunction
with the alienability
the parties stipulated
to the following

of the leaseholds,
facts:

34. The existing dealer at the time of the enactment of Act 257 may be able to sell his leasehold
at a premium that derives from the value of the
dealer's
leasehold
interest, given the reduced
rent imposed
by Act 257, assuming
Chevron
does not object in good faith when the selling
dealer seeks Chevron's
consent to the assignment.
35. Assuming
everything
else remains equal,
the market value of the lessee-dealer
leasehold

App.
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reasonably could be expected to increase
amount of the rent payable decreases.

as the

Based

moved

largely

on

these

facts,

Chevron

for

summary judgment on its takings claim. 2 Chevron argued
that Act 257 effects a regulatory
taking because it fails to
substantially
advance a legitimate state interest. Chevron
also maintained
that Act 257 prevents the company
from
receiving a just and reasonable
return. Finally, Chevron
contended
that Act 257 is unconstitutional
because
it
neither provides individualized
consideration,
nor contains a mechanism
for obtaining
relief from confiscatory
rent cap provisions.
Because the district court resolved
the first argument in Chevron's favor, it declined to reach
the other two.
On appeal, the State challenges both the standard
used by the district court to evaluate
Chevron's
regulatory taking claim and the court's application of that standard in the summary judgment context.

II
"States

have

broad

power

to regulate

. . . the land-

lord-tenant
relationship..,
without paying compensation
for all economic
injuries that such regulation
entails."
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 440 (1982). When a landowner
decides to rent his
land to tenants, the government
may place ceilings on the
rents the landowner
can charge. See, e.g., PennelI v. San
2 ChevTon's other three claims (42 U.S.C. § 1983, due
process and equal protection) were dismissed without prejudice
by stipulation of the parties and are not at issue in this appeal.
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lose, 485 U,S. 1, 11-12 (1988). "[Wlhile

property

may be

regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it
will be recognized
as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
The question in this case is whether Act 257 goes too
far. To analyze that question, the district court concluded
that "the appropriate
inquiry is whether
[Act 257] substantially advances
a legitimate
state interest."
In reaching this conclusion,
the court explicitly rejected the more
deferential
standard
urged by the State. The State argues
that the courts should look only to whether "the Legislature rationally
could have believed
the Act would substantially
advance
a legitimate
government
purpose. ''3
To support this position, the State relies on a footnote
in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissenting
opinion
in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987):
[O]ur inquiry into legislative
purpose is not
intended as a license to judge the effectiveness
of legislation.
When considering
the Fifth
Amendment
issues presented
by Hawaii's Land
Reform Act, we noted that the Act, "like any
other, may not be successful
in achieving
its
intended
goals. But 'whether
in fact the provisions will accomplish
the objectives is not the
3 Both the test used by the district court and that suggested
by the State require a legitimate state interest. In this case, the
district court found that the purpose of Act 257 is to "reduc[e]
gasoline prices for Hawaii's consumers." On appeal, the parties
do not contest this finding. Likewise, the parties do not dispute
the legitimacy of this interest.
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question: the [constitutional
requirement]
is satisfied if...
the...
[State] Legislature rationally
could have believed that the [Act] would promote its objective.' " Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 (1984).
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 511 n. 3 (alterations
in original). The
State's reliance on this quote is unsound
for two reasons.
First, as the district court correctly noted, Midkiff dealt
with a physical taking, rather than a regulatory
one. In a
physical
taking,
the government
exercises
its eminent
domain power to take private property for "public use."
Importantly,; the government
intends to take the property
and is willing to pay compensation
to the landowner. We
have recognized that a more deferential standard
applies
in those circumstances.
See Richardson v. City and County
of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
119 S.Ct. 168 (1998) ("[W]e see nothing inconsistent
in
applying heightened
scrutiny when the taking is uncompensated, and a more deferential
standard
when the taking is fully compensated.");
see also Hall v. City of Santa
Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1280 n. 25 (9th Cir. 1986) ("It
makes considerable
sense to give greater deference to the
legislature where it deliberately
resorts to its eminent
domain power than where it may have stumbled
into
exercising it through actions that incidentally
result in a
taking.").
Second, the State's argument
is foreclosed
by our
decision in Richardson. In Richardson, we established
that
land

use regulations,

including

rent control

ordinances

like Act 257 that permit the capture of a premium, do not
effect a taking if the regulation
"substantially
furthers a
legitimate state interest." Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1164; see

App.
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also Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485 ("[L]and

use regulation

can

effect a taking if it 'does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests,..,
or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.' ") (quoting
U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).

Agins v. Tiburon, 447

III
While we recognize
the concurring
opinion's dissatisfaction
with our application
of the "substantially
advances" test, we do not believe that our holding today
either expands
precedent.

Richardson or contravenes

Supreme

Court

Relying on Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1
(1988), the concurrence
asserts that rent control can ordinarily
rather

only be challenged
than as a regulatory

as violative
of due process,
taking. We read Pennell differ-

ently. In that case, a landlord challenged
the constitutionality of a city rent control ordinance
on three
grounds: (1) the Takings Clause; (2) Due Process; and (3)
Equal Protection.
See id. at 4. The Court summarized
the
'takings Clause claim as follows:
§ 5703.28 of the Ordinance
establishes
the seven
factors that a hearing officer is to take into
account in determining
the reasonable
rent
increase. The first six of these factors are all
objective, and are related either to the landlord's
costs of providing an adequate rental unit, or to
the condition
of the rental market. Application
of these six standards results in a rent that is
"reasonable"
by reference to what appellants
contend is the only legitimate purpose of rent
control: the elimination
of "excessive"
rents

App. 9
caused by San Jose's housing
shortage.
When
the hearing
officer
then takes into account
"hardship
to a tenant"
pursuant
to
§ 5703.28(c)(7) and reduces the rent below the
objectively
"reasonable"
amount established
the first six factors, this additional
reduction
the rent increase

constitutes

by
in

a "taking."

Id. at 9.
The Takings

Clause

claim in Pennell was not based

on

the mere existence of rent control, but was instead dependent on the hardship
provision. Indeed, because rent
control is not a per se taking, see FCC v. Florida Power
Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987), the landlord had to argue
why this particular rent control ordinance effected a taking. To do so, he focused on the hardship
provision,
as
the other factors apparently established
a reasonable rent.
The Court neither explicitly nor implicitly approved
or
disapproved
of the landlord's
argument.
In fact, the
Court declined to reach the merits of the Takings Clause
claim because the hardship
provision
had never been
applied.
See Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9-10. The Court did
proceed
to analyze
the landlord's
remaining
constitutional arguments.
It did not, however, intimate in any
way that rent control provisions
should only be analyzed
under the Due Process Clause. Rather, the Court determined that the Takings Clause claim was premature
and
then analyzed the Due Process Clause claim under the
Due Process "reasonableness"
test.
Moreover, to the extent that "something
else" is
required to challenge a rent control ordinance under the
Takings Clause, the existence of the premium in this case
suffices. The stipulated
possibility
that an incumbent

App.
dealer will be able to capture
rent in the form of a premium
ordinary

rent control

10
the value
separates

situation,

where

of the decreased
Act 257 from an
such a transfer

is

prohibited.
Logically; it makes far more sense for us to analyze
Chevron's
regulatory
takings claim under the Takings
Clause test than it does to review it under
the Due
Process Clause test. Chevron raised a Due Process Clause
claim in its First Amended
Complaint,
but chose not to
move for summary
judgment on that claim. Once the
district court in this case granted
Chevron's
summary
judgment
motion on the Takings Clause claim, Chevron
dismissed
its remaining
claims without prejudice. Thus,
there is no Due Process claim for us to review, even if we
were so inclined.
The concurring
opinion also downplays
the significance of the Supreme
Court's language
in Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992). Although
the Court in Yee
did not conclusively
announce the applicable test for a
regulatory
takings challenge
to a rent control statute, it
did suggest that the possibility of a premium similar to
the one in this case "might have some bearing on whether
the ordinance causes a regulatory
taking, as it may shed
some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance."
Id. at 530. The Court then cited Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), which
employs the "substantially
advances"
test.
The Yee Court

went

slightly

further

than

in Pennell

and held that the facial regulatory
takings challenge was
ripe. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 534. The Court did not reach the

App.
merits

of the regulatory

11

takings

claim, however,

because

it concluded that the issue was not fairly presented in the
certiorari
petition. See id. at 537. In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that "were we to address the issue
here, we would apparently be the first court in the Nation
to determine whether an ordinance like this one effects a
regulatory

taking."

Although

Id. at 538.

the Court

recognized

the novelty

of the

regulatory
takings claim, it did not take an)' position on
its merits. The ordinance
in Yee is very similar to Act 257,
in that the transfer of the mobile homes in Yee and the
service station leaseholds here both create the possibility
of a one-time transfer of wealth in the form of a premium
that inures to incumbent
lessees. Had the Court in Pennell
rejected a regulatory takings challenge such as the one
posed by Chevron in the instant case, as the concurring
opinion suggests, the Court in Yee would not have needed
to expressly decline to reach the issue. We believe that the
Court's treatment
of the regulatory
takings issue in Yee
further undermines
the concurrence's
reading of Pennell.
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687 (1999), gives additional support to the application of the "substantially
advances"
test to Chevron's
Takings Clause claim. Although
the Court recognized
that it has not provided a "thorough explanation
of the
nature or applicability
of the requirement
that a regulation substantially
advance legitimate public interests outside the context of required dedications
or exactions,"
it
noted that the jury instructions
given by the trial court
regarding the "substantially
advances"
test were consistent with the Court's previous
general discussions
of
regulatory

takings

liability.

Id. at 704. As support

for this

App.
statement,

the

takings cases,
that the Court

Court

cited
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several

land

use regulatory

including
Yee. See id. It is apparent
to us
viewed the rent control ordinance
in Yee in

the same manner

as the land use regulations

cases. It is further

apparent

in the other

to us that when challenged

a regulatory
taking, each is subject
tially advances"
test.

as

to the same "substan-

We have great difficulty finding Supreme Court precedent to support
the concurring
opinion's assertion that
rent control should be viewed differently than other land
use regulations.
Accord Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 968 P.2d 993, 1021 (Cal. 1999) (Baxter, J., dissenting)
("[W]e

cannot

assume

that

decisions

forms of price control are authority
clause challenge
to a rent control

upholding

for rejecting
ordinance.").

other
a takings

The concurring
opinion also does not satisfactorily
explain how to deal with Richardson. Richardson is the law
of our circuit and has conclusively
answered the question
of what test should be applied in this case. Nevertheless,
the concurring
opinion attempts
to avoid the holding of
Richardson by inventing
a "certainty"
requirement
that
does not exist. The concurrence
would limit the "substantially advances"
test to cases in which "the existence of
the premium capture is essentially beyond dispute."
We
do not believe that Richardson may faithfully be read so
narrowly. 4
4 We also do not believe that our decision today expands
the holding of Richardson. We save for another day the question
of whether the "substantially advances" test applies outside the
context of rent control statutes that permit the capture of a
premium.
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Finally, we note that other federal cases have applied
the "substantially
advances" test in considering
a regulatory takings challenge to a rent control ordinance.
See
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. New York State Div. of
Hous. and Community Renewal, 83 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1996)
(concluding that rent stabilization
law does not constitute
either physical or regulatory
taking); Greystone Hotel Co.
v. City of New York, 13 F.Supp.2d 524, 527-29 (S.D.N.Y.)
(concluding that rent stabilization
provision substantially
advanced a legitimate state interest and thus did not
effect a regulatory
taking); Adamson Cos. v. City of Malibu,
854 F.Supp. 1476, 1501-02 (C.D.Cal.1994) (concluding
that
city's mobile home rent control ordinance
was substantially

related

to a legitimate

interest).

In sum, we disagree with the concurrenee's
position
that we should apply the "reasonableness"
test to evaluate Chevron's regulatory
takings claim. The correct test is
"whether the legislation
substantially
advances
a legitimate state interest," as discussed above, as suggested
by
the Supreme Court in Yee, as used by the district court in
this case, and as established
by this court in Richardson.
IV
Although
the district court applied the correct standard, it should
not have granted
summary
judgment.
Notwithstanding
the fact that both sides moved for summary judgment

and agreed

that summary

judgment

was

App.
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appropriate
one way or the other, genuine
rial fact remain, s

ment

issues

of mate-

We review a district court's grant of summary
judgde novo. See Balint v. Carson City, 180 F.3d 1047,

1050 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). We determine, viewing the
evidence
in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving
party, whether
the district
court correctly
applied
the
relevant substantive
law and whether there are any genuine issues of material
fact. See id. Because Chevron challenges
Act 257 on its face, rather
than as applied,
Chevron bears the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that the regulation
does not substantially
advance a legitimate
state interest. See City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 700-01
(1999).

s At least one court has held that, under
similar
circumstances involving cross-motions for summary judgment,
a party that failed to raise the existence of genuine issues of
material fact before the district court waived the right to do so
on appeal. See Shrink Mzssouri Gov't PACv. Maupin, 71 F.3d 1422,
1423 (8th Cir. 1995). Even then, however, the court proceeded to
analyze whether genuine issues ot material fact remained. The
better-reasoned
approach holds that the district court is
responsible
for determining
whether the requirements
of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are met, whether or not the
parties believe that they are. See, e.g., William W Schwarzer et
al., The Analysis and Decision of SurnmaryJudgment Motions, 139
F.RD. 441,499 (Feb.1992) ("The filing of cross-motions does not
ensure that summary judgment is in order.").
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A
The State argues

here that Chevron

was not entitled

to summary judgment
because the district court ignored
genuine issues of fact raised by the affidavit of its expert
economist,
Dr. Keith Leffler. Chevron,
in its moving
papers, relied solely on the stipulated fact that an existing
dealer may be able to sell his leasehold at a premium that
derives from the increased value of the dealer's leasehold
interest due to the reduced rent imposed by Act 257.
Based on this possible premium transfer, Chevron argued
that the benefits of Act 257 will inure to the incumbent
dealer, rather than to consumers.
Thus, according
to
Chevron, Act 257 does not substantially
advance its purpose of lowering gasoline prices.
The State
argument.

relied

on Dr. Leffler

In his affidavit,

Dr. Leffler

to rebut

Chevron's

asserted

that

Act

257 is likely to lessen the adverse competitive
effects that
result from the highly concentrated
gasoline market in
Hawaii and thereby benefit consumers. This is so, according to Dr. Leffler, because lower monthly rent payments
reduce a dealer's cost of continued operation,
meaning
more dealers are likely to stay in business. The presence
of more dealers means a greater supply of fuel to consumers and a greater supply leads to lower prices. Therefore, Dr. Leffler predicted that the rent cap would act to
lower retail gasoline
prices.
Although
Dr. Leffler
acknowledged
that an oil company could raise the wholesale cost of gasoline to dealers in order to make up for
lost rent, he believed that wholesale oil suppliers would
be unlikely to do so because such action would lead
directly to reductions
in volume as dealers
by raising their street price. He also believed

would react
that while a

App.
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premium
transfer
was possible,
an incumbent
dealer
could not be expected to capture the net present value of
the reduced
rent because
the net present
value would
depend on too many unknown
variables,
such as the oil
company's
rent policy, the future level of gasoline margins, and the sales of goods other than gasoline. Even if
new lessee dealers could estimate the present value of
rent reductions
accurately,
Dr. Leffler stated that any cost
reductions
would be fully captured by incumbent
dealers
only if the market for the sale of lessee dealer rights was
perfectly
competitive.
Relying on the stipulated
facts,
which indicate that less than three sales of dealer rights
occur per year, Dr. Leffler concluded that the market is
relatively
thin, rather than perfectly competitive.
Finally,
because Act 257 encourages
dealers to stay in business
longer by lowering
fixed costs, Dr. Leffler asserted that
Act 257 will benefit consumers
even if the premium
is
fully captured.

davit

In response to Dr. Leffler, Chevron proffered an affifrom its own expert economist
Dr. John Umbeck.

Dr. Umbeck's
opinion
Dr. Leffler. Dr. Umbeck

differs significantly
from that of
believes that Act 257 will reduce

the net present value of an
and thereby discourage
oil
stations
or maintaining
Umbeck asserted that Act

oil company's
rental revenue
companies from building new
old ones. Accordingly,
Dr.
257 will actually increase the

concentration
of Hawaii's
gasoline market, rather than
decrease it. Because Dr. Umbeck believes that there will
be fewer stations
in the
demand
facing surviving

long run, he states that the
dealers
will increase,
thus

motivating
and allowing them to raise fuel prices. Finally,
Dr. Umbeck disputes
Dr. Leffler's conclusion
that the

App.
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for

Umbeck
rent

the

believes

will

of fact

lower

gasoline

ron will raise
rent,

captured

dealers

will

prices.

capture

district
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the
upon

questions.

court
was

rights

purported
premature.

value

dealer.

to what

to what

value

of the

transfer
Moreover,
to answer

that

genuine

257 will

of fuel

Dr.

of the capped

incumbent

Act

and

price
and

is thin.

establish

Whether,

whether,

as unanswered

the

as to whether

its wholesale

of a premium

by

affidavits

remain

and

dealer

the premium

conflicting

issues

form
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that

be fully
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sale

17

result

extent,

Chev-

to compensate
extent,
capped

these

for

incumbent
rent

of the leasehold,
to the

in

extent
questions,

in the
remain
that

the
such
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That the district court engaged in improper
fact-finding
is
apparent
from its summary
judgment
order. For instance, the
court found, despite evidence to the contrary, that "[b]ecause
oil
companies
can simply raise their wholesale
prices to the same
extent that rent decreases,
the dealer is likely to be unaffected
by the rent cap, and gas prices will remain unchanged."
Because this case will be tried to the court, rather than a
jury, the question arises whether it was improper
for the district
court to engage in fact-finding,
since it will eventually
be called
upon to perform that very task. This court has held that if the
parties
agree that all of the underlying
material
facts are
reflected in the written record, a judge may decide factual issues
and essentially
convert cross-motions
for summary
judgment
into submission
of the case for trial on the written record. See
Starsky v. Williams, 512 F.2d 109, 111 (9th Cir. 1975). The court
noted, however,
that that result was justified
Dy the unique
circumstances
of that case. See id. Moreover,
the court later
cautioned
that such fact-finding
is not appropriate
on an
undeveloped
factual
record. See TransWorld Airlines, Inc. v.
American Coupon Exchange, Inc., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990}.
There, the court stated:

App.

Admittedly,
rather

than

ment

these

historical

is no more

disputed.

(reversing
sought

appropriate

summary
under

of

when

predictive

fact,

summary

judg-

predictive

Post Co. v. United

Servs.,

predictions).
access

questions

fact. Nevertheless,

See Washington

Health and Human

experts'

are
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facts

States

Dep't of

865 F. 2d 320, 326 (D.C.Cir.
judgment
In

the

based

Washington
Freedom

on

Post,

are

1989)

conflicting
the

of Information

plaintiff
Act,

5

U.S.C. § 552, to certain
financial
disclosure
forms filed by
National
Cancer
Institute
consultants.
See id. at 321. The
district

court

granted

summary

judgment

in favor

of the

[W]here the ultimate
fact in dispute
is destined
for
decision by the court rather than by a jury, there is no
reason
why the court
and the parties
should
go
through
the motions
of a trial if the court
will
eventually
end up deciding
on the same record.
However, just as the procedural
shortcut must not be
disfavored,
courts
must
not rush
to dispose
summarily
of cases - especially
novel, complex, or
otherwise
difficult
cases of public
importance
unless
it is clear
that more
complete
factual
development
could not possibly
alter the outcome
and that the credibility
of the witnesses'
statements
or
testimony
is not at issue. Even when the expense of
further proceedings
is great and the moving party's
case seems
to the court quite likely to succeed,
speculation
about the/acts
must not take the place of
investigation,
proof, and direct observation.
ld. at 684-85. Although
the parties
in this case submitted
a
Stipulation
of Facts, there is no clear indication,
as there ,,.,'as in
Starsky, that all of the relevant facts are contained
in the written
record. In fact, in the Stipulation
itself, the parties clearly
reserve the right to rely on other statements.
Therefore, we hold
that the district court erred in resolving factual disputes at this
stage, even though it must do so later.
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government.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that a genuine issue of material
fact existed as to the effect of
disclosure on the government's
ability to obtain
mation it needed from its scientist-consultants.
so holding,

the court reviewed

and concluded
genuine

issue

that

the evidence

the conflicting

of fact regarding

in the record

affidavits

the consequences

closing the sought-after
information.
rejected the trial court's explanation

the inforSee id. In

The court
that

created

a

of disexplicitly

[r]esolution of this dispute involves an analysis
of the potential,
hypothetical
impairment
the
government
might suffer ....
Due to the nature
of the inquiry, there is no definitive proof that
may be adduced by either side in support of
their respective contentions.
At best, the parties
may provide the Court with speculation
from
individuals
who speak with varying degrees of
authority.
ld. at 324. The

court

"short-circuited

the fact-finding

court

further

explained

held

that

the

district

process."

court

had

Id. at 326. The

that:

"Factual" issues like those presented
here are
rarely susceptible
to definitive
proof. Rather,
"factual"
issues that involve predictive
facts
almost always
require
a court to survey
the
available
evidence,
to credit certain pieces of
evidence above others, and to draw cumulative
inferences until it reaches a judgmental
conclusion. In the end, the court makes its best assessment about what is most likely to happen in the
future. In such an inquiry, the ultimate "facts" in
dispute are most successfully
approached
when
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all relevant
developed.

evidentiary

underpinnings

are fully

Id. at 326.
As in Washington Post, the experts'
tions here created
uation

genuine

of Act 257 depends

issues
upon

conflicting

predic-

of fact. A proper
further

eval-

development

of

the experts'
underlying
facts. Although
both experts
based their opinions on the stipulated
facts, they also rely
on other unproven

factual

assumptions.

In order

to deter-

mine whose predictions
are more accurate,
there needs to
be a better understanding
of the competitiveness
of the
market for the sale and purchase
of lessee
and the elasticity of demand
for gasoline.

dealer rights
This can be

attained

development

only

through

and cross-examination
Cross-examination
because

additional

factual

of the parties'
expert witnesses,
is particularly
appropriate
here

it is necessary

for the court

to evaluate

the wit-

nesses' credibility in order to evaluate their expert opinions. By adopting
the predictions
of Chevron's
expert
without the benefit of this needed
information,
the district court

"short-circuited

the fact-finding

process."

B
Issues of fact do not preclude
summary
judgment
unless they are material to the substantive
claim at issue,
that is, unless they "might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing
law." Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro.
Police Dep't,

159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th

Cir.

1998) (quoting

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
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disputes here are material only if their resolualter whether Act 257 "substantially
advances
state

interest."

In order to determine
materiality,
we first determine
what is required by the "substantially
advances"
test.
Obviously, a connection
of some sort must be established
between Act 257's means (that is, a maximum
regulated
rent) and the intended end (lower gas prices). The question arises whether the mere possibility that the rent cap
will not achieve its purpose
is sufficient
to destroy this
nexus. The district court, relying on Richardson, believed
this to be the case. If that belief is correct, the factual
disputes are not material because the parties concede that
that possibility exists. If, however, the standard
requires a
closer evaluation
of the likelihood
that the means will
achieve

the end,

then

these

disputes

are material:

In Richardson, we held that a Honolulu

ordinance

that

imposed a cap on rent for land under condominium
units
was an unconstitutional
regulatory taking. The court concluded that:
The absence of a mechanism that prevents lessees from capturing
the net present value of the
reduced land rent in the form of a premium,
means that the Ordinance
will not substantially
further its goal of creating affordable owneroccupied
housing
in Honolulu.
Incumbent
owner occupants who sell to those who intend
to occupy the apartment will charge a premium
for the benefit of living in a rent controlled
condominium.
The price of housing ultimately
will remain the same. The Ordinance
thus
effects a regulatory
taking.

App.
124 F.3d at 1166.
ardson was based
incumbent
owners
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Importantly,
our conclusion
in Richon the district
court's
findings
that
will charge a premium
and that the

price of housing will remain
findings were not contested

the same. Apparently,
on appeal.

these

Whether
the price of gasoline will remain the same
here is vigorously
contested.
The mere possibility
that it
will does not satisfy Chevron's
burden of proving that
Act 257 does not substantially
further its purpose. Logically, there must be a determination
of the likelihood
of
that possibility. Otherwise,
regulatory
legislation
would
be unconstitutional
any time it was not absolutely
guaranteed to achieve its purpose. Would a statute that was
95% likely to be effective fail to substantially
advance its
interest simply because there was a 5% chance that it
would not achieve its goal? What if the statute was 99%
effective? Surely the 1% chance that it would be ineffective does not, as a matter of law, mean that the statute
does

not "substantially

advance"

its purpose.

Not only does such a reading of Richardson fail the
logic test, but it also fails to consider
the language.
Had
the test been intended
to require an absolute cause-andeffect relationship,
the word "substantially"
would have
no meaning. For these reasons, the district court improperly relied on Richardson to conclude that the absence of a
mechanism that prevents a premium
destroys
the constitutionally-required

transfer necessarily
connection.

The State argues that the existence of a premium is
not relevant. As discussed
in Section lfI above, however,
the Supreme Court recognized
U.S. at 530. While the existence

this relevance in Yee, 503
of a premium transfer had
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nothing
to do with a physical taking, the Court stated
that "[t]his effect might have some bearing on whether
the ordinance causes a regulatory
taking, as it may shed
some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between
the effect of the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance."
that the possibility

Id. The Supreme
of a premium

defeated that connection; it recognized
have some bearing" on it. Id.

Court did not hold
transfer
necessarily
only that it "might

The questio n remains as to what exactly the connection does require.
In a candid statement,
the Supreme
Court recently acknowledged
that it has not provided
a
"thorough
explanation
of the nature or applicability
of
the requirement
that a regulation
substantially
advance
legitimate public interests outside the context of required
dedications
or exactions .... " City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at
704. In City of Monterey, the Court affirmed judgment
in
favor of Del Monte Dunes, a property
owner who contended that the city's repeated rejections of its plans for
development
effected an unconstitutional
regulatory
taking. The Court held that the case was properly submitted
to a jury. Although the Court refused to consider the City
of Monterey's
challenge
to the jury instructions,
as the
City itself had proposed their essence, the Court nonetheless noted that the following jury instructions
were consistent
with
the Court's
regulatory
takings liabilitv:

previous

discussions

"Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which substantially
advance
legitimate public interest[s] ....
So one of your
jobs as jurors is. to decide if the city's decision

of

App.
here substantially
public purpose.

advanced
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any such legitimate

"The regulatory
actions of the city or any
agency substantially
advanc[e] a legitimate public purpose of the action bears a reasonable
relationship to that objective.
"Now, if the preponderance
of the evidence
establishes
that there was no reasonable
relationship
between
the
city's
denial
of
the . . . proposal and legitimate public purpose,
you should find in favor of the plaintiff. If you
find that there existed a reasonable relationship
between
the city's decision
and a legitimate
public purpose, you should find in favor of the
city. As long as the regulatory action by the city
substantially
advances their [sic] legitimate public purpose ....
its underlying
motives and
reasons are not to be inquired into."
526 U.S. at 700-01.
lenged
interest
est.

Based on these

instructions,

a chal-

regulatory
action "substantially
advances"
its
if it bears a reasonable relationship
to that inter-

Understanding
what the "substantially
advances"
test requires also depends to some extent on understanding what it does not require. In City of Monterey, the Court
declined
to extend
the "rough
proportionality"
test
beyond the special context of exactions - land use decisions conditioning
approval
of development
on the dedication of property
to public use. See id. at 702-03. Thus,
City of Monterey teaches that a reasonable
relationship
does not depend on the State's action being roughly
proportional
to its asserted interests.
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Act 257's rent cap is reasonably

related

to its

objective of lowering
fuel prices certainly
depends
on
whether
it will in fact lead to lower fuel prices. The
factual issues that remain in dispute are material to the
ultimate determination
required
in this action. We hold
that the district court should not have granted
judgment
on Chevron's
first argument.

summary

C
Because the judgment
can be affirmed
on any basis
supported
in the record, we briefly consider
the second
and third arguments
made by Chevron in its summary
judgment motion, even though the district court did not.
There are two ways in which a party can challenge
a
regulatory
action on its face. The first has been thoroughly discussed above. The second depends on whether
the regulation
deprives
an owner of the economic
viability of property. An owner is not denied the economic
viability of property, unless there remains no permissible
or beneficial use for that property
after the regulatory
action. See City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 700 (quoting jury
instruction
to that effect). Chevron has made no such
showing. In fact, the evidence shows that Act 257 allows
Chevron to charge approximately
$1.1 million more than
it would otherwise have charged under its own rental
program. Although this evidence may be useful to Chevron in demonstrating
the ineffectiveness
of Act 257, it
belies its claim of loss of economic
Chevron

also argues

because

it fails to provide

eration

and contains

viability.

that Act 257 is unconstitutional
for any individualized

no mechanism

for obtaining

considrelief

App.
from the confiscatory
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rent limitation

provisions.

In sup-

port of this argument,
Chevron relies on two state court
cases and one of the two district court orders in Richardson. See Cromwell Assocs. v. Mayor and Council of Newark, 511 A.2d 1273, 1275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985);
Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1028-1033 (Cal.
1976); Richardson v. City and County of Honohdu, 802 E
Supp. 326, 336-37 (D. Haw. 1992) ("Richardson II'). The
precedents
established
in these cases do not bind us.
Although
addressed
by the district court in Richardson II,
in Richardson we declined
to reach the issue on appeal.
Likewise, the Supreme
Court in Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968), refused to decide whether
individualized
consideration
and administrative
relief
were "constitutionally
imperative."
Earlier
Supreme
Court cases, however,
have suggested
that there are no
such constitutional
requirements.
In Bowles v. Willingham,
321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944), the Court stated that otherwise
valid
class

price-fixing
was not improper
because it was on a
rather than an individual
basis. Justice Brandeis

stated for a unanimous
Court in Phillips v. Commissioner,
283 U.S. 589, 596-97 (1931), that "[w]here only property
rights are involved,
mere postponement
of the judicial
enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
given for the ultimate
judicial determination
of the liability is adequate."
As evidenced
by the instant action,
Chevron was not denied an opportunity
to seek judicial
review of Act 257.
Finally, the cases relied upon by Chevron - Cromwell
Associates, Birkenfeld, and Richardson II - are distinguishable because they involved ordinances
that regulated a
landlord's
sole source of revenue. Imposing a maximum
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rent removed the only mechanism
by which a landlord
could increase revenues in the event of an increase in
costs. Chevron's
lessee dealer stations
provide Chevron
with two sources of revenue. For the past 20 years, Chevron has relied on its lessee dealers' contractually-required
purchase of gasoline to assure a reasonable
rate of return
on its service stations.
Act 257 does not regulate
this
revenue source. Accordingl?,; Act 257's failure to contain
an administrative
relief provision
does not result in a
facial taking.

V
Genuine

issues

of material

fact exist as to whether

Act 257 will benefit consumers.
Specifically,
the record
contains conflicting
evidence
as to whether
incumbent
dealers will capture a premium based on the increased
value of their leaseholds due to the imposition of a maximum permissible
regulated
rent, thereby depriving
new
dealers and consumers
from reaping the benefits of Act
257. Questions
also remain as to whether oil companies
will raise the wholesale
price of fuel and thereby unilaterally offset the benefits of the Act. Because resolution
of these factual issues is necessary
to determine
whether
Act 257 substantially
advances,
or bears a reasonable
relationship

to, the State's

interest

in lowering

gasoline

prices, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. Summary judgment
is likewise inappropriate
on
the other two grounds urged by Chevron.
We VACATE the judgment of the district
REMAND for further proceedings
consistent
opinion.

court
with

and
this
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W. FLETCHER,
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Judge, concurring

in the judg-

ment:
I disagree
with the majority's
analysis.
Plaintiff
Chevron challenges
Hawaii Act 257, a rent control law
limiting the amount an oil company can charge a dealer
who leases a service station from the company. In a
motion for summary
257 is unconstitutional.
unconstitutional,

judgment,
Chevron argued that Act
The district court found Act 257

granted

Chevron's

motion,

final judgment
for Chevron. Defendant
appealed.
We reverse and remand.
For the reasons

and entered

Cayetano

timely

that follow, ! concur in the reversal

of

the grant of summary judgment to Chevron. I disagree,
however,
with the majority's
rationale
and with the task
the majority
has set for the district court on remand.

I
There are two distinct tests of constitutionality
potentially applicable
to Act 257. The first is a "reasonableness" test normally
applied to rent control laws. The
second
is a "substantially
advances
a legitimate
state
interest" test normally applied to zoning and land use
regulations.
Relying on our earlier decision in Richardson
v. City and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
1997), the majority
analyzes
Act 257 under the second
test. The problem in this case is not determining
whether
the majority has properly
applied that test. The problem,
rather, is determining
whether the test should be applied
at all.
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An ordinary rent control
tinguishable
from a price

law is constitutionally
control
law. Rent

indiscontrol

involves a price charged for real property, just as price
control involves a price charged for personal property.
The constitutional
test for ordinary rent and price control
laws is the same, regardless of whether the laws are
challenged
under the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause. The test has been variously
formulated,
but it
essentially requires that the law be "reasonable"
and "not
confiscatory."
A few examples illustrate
the point.
In Pennell v. City of San Jose, 488 U.S. 1, 11 (1988), the
Supreme Court cited a rate regulation case in upholding
a
municipal
rent control ordinance
challenged
under the
Due Process Clause. The Court upheld the ordinance
because it was not "'arbitrary,
discriminator);
or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to
adopt ....
' Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
769-770 (1968)." In FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S.
245, 253 (1987), the Court upheld a rate regulation
challenged under the Takings Clause as "not confiscatory."
Citing the same rate regulation
case as PennelI, it wrote
that a regulation
is permitted under the Constitution
to
"'limit
stringently
the return recovered
on investment,
for investors' interests provide only one of the variables
in the constitutional
calculus of reasonableness.'"
Id. (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. at 769). In In re
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, the 1968 case cited in both
Pennell and FCC v. Florida Power, the Court upheld a rate
set by the Federal Power Commission
without specifying
whether the challenge was brought under the Due Process or Takings Clause: "any rate selected by the Commission from the broad zone of reasonableness
. . . cannot
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properly be attacked as confiscatory."
390 U.S. at 770. In
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 517 (1944), the Court
upheld a federal rent control law after applying the same
test as for a price control law: "Of course, price control,
the same as other forms of regulation,
may reduce the
value of the property

regulated.

But . . . that does not

mean that the regulation
is unconstitutional."
Finally, in
Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. 575, 585 (1942), the Court

upheld

a rate regulation

challenged
under the Due Process Clause
"reasonable"
and "not confiscatory."

because

it was

Beginning
with Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980), the Supreme Court developed
a more stringent
test of constitutionality
for zoning and land use regulation cases. The zoning ordinance in Agins severely limited
development

of privately

serve open space
the constitutionality

owned

land

in order

to pre-

for the community.
The Court upheld
of the ordinance against a regulatory

taking
challenge
because
the ordinance
"substantially
advance[d]
legitimate
state goals." Id. at 261. In Nollan v.
California
California
beachfront

Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), the
Coastal Commission
required
owners of a
house

to grant

a public

easement

across their

property as a condition for receiving a permit to rebuild
the house. Citing Agins, the Court stated, "[O]ur verbal
formulations
in the takings
field have generally
been
quite different

[from those applicable

to due process].

We

have required that the regulation
'substantially
advance'
the 'legitimate
state interest' sought be achieved, not that
the State could rationally have decided that the measure
adopted

might

achieve

the State's

objectives."

Id. at 834
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n.3 (emphasis
in original; citations and internal quotations omitted). The Court further required that the easement have a connection,
or "essential nexus," to the harm
that would be caused by rebuilding
the house. Absent
such a nexus, the required conveyance of an easement to
the public would be nothing more than "extortion."
Id. at
837. Finally, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994),
the city of Tigard, Oregon, required the owner of a commercial building to dedicate a portion of her property for
parking
and floodplain
protection
as a condition
of
receiving a permit to expand the building.
The Court
repeated
the test from Agins and refined
the Nollan
"essential nexus" test. "A land use regulation
does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially
advance[s]
legitimate
state interests' and does not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.'"
Id. at 385. Further,
a
"required
dedication"
from the landowner
is constitutionally permissible
if it bears a "rough proportionality"
to the "nature and extent of the impact of the proposed
development"
for which the permit is sought. Id. at 391,
The Supreme Court has applied
the "substantially
advances a legitimate
state interest" test of Agins, and its
refinement
in Nollan and Dolan, only in cases of severe
zoning limitations
on the use of land (Agins) and required
dedications
by landowners
as a condition
of receiving
building
permits
(Nollan and Dolan). See, e.g., City of
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 119 S.Ct.
1624, 1635-36 (1999) ('[WJe have not extended
the rough
proportionality
test of Dolan beyond the special context of
exactions - land-use decisions conditioning
approval
of
development
on the dedication
of property
to public
use ....
IT]his Court has [not] provided . . . a thorough
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explanation
of the nature or applicability
of the requirement that a regulation
substantially
advance
legitimate
public interests outside the context of required dedications or exactions.").
In two cases, however,
the Supreme
Court has hinted
that, in special circumstances,
a rent
control law might amount
to a regulatory
taking and
might therefore be subject to the "substantially
advances
a legitimate
state interest"
test.
In 1988, the Court

considered

a San Jose, California,

rent control ordinance
in Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485
U.S. 1 (1988). The Court made clear that the ordinance,
considered
as a whole, should
normal reasonableness
test:

be analyzed

under

the

The standard
for determining
whether a state
price-control
regulation
is constitutional
under
the Due Process Clause is well-established:
"Price control is 'unconstitutional...
if arbitrar);
discriminatory,
or demonstrably
irrelevant to the
policy the legislature is free to adopt ....
'"
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
769-770 (1968).
485 U.S. at 11 (citation omitted). Applying this test, the
Court sustained the rent control ordinance,
holding that it
represented
"a rational attempt to accommodate
the conflicting interests of protecting
tenants from burdensome
rent increases while at the same time ensuring that the
landlords are guaranteed
a fair return on their investment." Id. at 13.
The plaintiffs

also

brought

a Takings

Clause

chal-

lenge to a specific
provision
in the ordinance
that
appeared
to require a direct wealth transfer to a particular tenant based on the poverty of that tenant. Under the
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seeking

a rent

increase

of more

than 8% was required to go before a hearing officer who
was authorized
to consider, among other factors, individual hardship. If the proposed increase above 8% constituted "'an
unreasonably
severe financial
or economic
hardship on a particular
tenant,'"
the increase could be
denied. Id. at 6. The landlords
contended
that denial of a
proposed increase on that ground would constitute
taking, but the Court refused to decide the challenge,
even to specify

a test for deciding

it, because

sion had never been applied and a decision
fore be "premature."
Id. at 9.
Next,

a
or

the provi-

would

there-

in Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992),

the Court addressed
a takings challenge to an Escondido,
California, mobile home rent control ordinance
brought
by owners

of a mobile home park. As background

to their

challenge, the park owners pointed out that, despite
name, mobile homes are not mobile; once placed
park, only about one mobile

their
in a

home in 100 is ever moved.

See id. at 523. The park owners also pointed
to California's Mobilehome
Residency Law, which severely limited
their ability to terminate
mobile home owners' tenancies
or prevent transfer of tenancies
to purchasers
of the
mobile homes. The park owners contended
that the rent
control

ordinance,

when viewed

against

this background,

amounted
to a physical taking of their property.
525. The Court rejected this contention.

See id. at

The park owners
further contended
that the ordinance constituted
a regulatory
taking, but the Court
refused to consider the issue because it was not included

App.

34

in the grant of certiorari. However, in rejecting the plaintiffs' claim of physical taking, the Court wrote the following:
[TJhe effect of the rent control ordinance,
coupled with the restrictions
on the park owner's
freedom to reject new tenants,
is to increase
significantly
the value of the mobile home. This
increased value normally
benefits only the tenant in possession at the time the rent control is
imposed ....
Petitioners are correct in citing the
existence
of this premium
as a difference
between
the alleged effect of the Escondido
ordinance
and that of an ordinary
apartment
rent control statute. Most apartment
tenants do
not sell anything
to their successors
(and are
often prohibited
from charging
"key money"),
so a typical rent control statute will transfer
wealth from the landlord to the incumbent
tenant and future tenants. By contrast, petitioners
contend that the Escondido
ordinance
transfers
wealth only to the incumbent
mobile home
owner. This effect might have some bearing on
whether
the ordinance
causes a regulatory taking, as it may shed some light on whether there
is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the
ordinance
and the objectives
it is supposed
to
advance. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comrn'n.
But it has nothing to do with whether the ordinance causes a physical taking.
Id. at 530 (citation

omitted).

A panel of this court in Richardson relied on this
passage from Yee in evaluating
a Honolulu
rent control
ordinance. The ordinance limited long-term ground rents
for residential condominiums
and allowed condominiumowners/ground-lessees

to sell their

condominiums,

and
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their leaseholds,
without restriction.
It was clear that by
selling their condominiums
and leaseholds,
the condominium owners could, like the mobile home owners in
Yee, capture a premium representing
the present value of
the difference
between the controlled
rent for the ground
lease and the open market rent that would be charged in
the absence of the ordinance.
Because of this one-time
wealth

transfer

to the current

condominium

owners,

Rich-

ardson treated the ordinance
as a regulatory
taking and
applied the "substantially
advances
a legitimate
state
interest"
test from Agins, Nollan and Dolan: "A land use
regulation
. . . does not effect a taking if it substantially
furthers a legitimate
state interest and does not deny the
landowner
economically
viable use of his land. Dolan, 512
U.S. at 385" 124 F.3d at 1164. Richardson then struck down
the ordinance because the ability of the owner to capture
the premium by selling the condominium
at an open
market price meant that the ordinance did not "substantially further its goal of creating affordable
owner-occupied housing in Honolulu."
ld. at 1166.
The panel today greatly expands the holding
ardson. Following the Supreme Court's suggestion
Richardson held that the "substantially
mate state interest" test was applicable

in Richin Yee,

advances
a legitiin a case where it

was clear that there was a premium resulting in a onetime wealth transfer
from the landlord
to the tenant.
Absent such a transfer, the ordinance
in Richardson would
have been subject to the reasonableness
test normally
applied to rent control ordinances.
In deciding whether to
apply the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest test," the majority in this case does not first ask how
clear it is that such a premium

will be captured

by the
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lessee. Rather, it treats Richardson as creating a presumptive rule that rent control laws are to be evaluated under
the "substantially
advances
a legitimate
state interest"
test rather than the reasonableness
test: "We established
in Richardson that
control ordinances

land use regulations,
including
rent
like Act 257, do not effect a taking if

the regulation
'substantially
furthers a legitimate
state
interest.' Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1164." Maj. Op. at 11723.
When the majority says that "rent ordinances
like Act
257" are subject to the "substantially
advances
a legitimate state interest" test, it appears to mean that the mere
possibility of a premium capture by an incumbent
tenant
is enough to render a rent control ordinance
"like Act
257." It writes, "The stipulated
possibility that an incumbent dealer will be able to capture the value of the
decreased rent in the form of a premium separates Act
257 from an ordinary
rent control situation[.]"
Maj. Op. at
11725 (emphasis added). But the possibility of premium
capture exists under virtually all rent control ordinances.
Even under ordinances
under which subleasing
and
assigning
resulting
monplace.

are prohibited,
subleasing
and assigning
premium
capture) are nonetheless
often

We do not know in this case whether

the tenants

(and
com-

will,

in fact, capture a premium.
But even without
knowing
this, the majority has determined
that the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest" test should be used
to test the constitutionality
of Act 257. The majority might
respond
mining
whether

that it does not matter that, at the time of deterwhat test to apply, the Court does not know
a premium
will be captured.
That is, if upon
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investigation
it turns out that there is no captured
premium, the ordinance will pass the test. In other words, no
harm, no foul. The problem with this response is that the
constitutional
test applied by the majority is not phrased
in terms of whether a premium is captured.
Rather, the
test asks whether
the rent control ordinance
"substantially advances a legitimate state interest." Premium capture by the tenant is only one of many ways in which an
ordinance can fail that test. Thus, if it turns out that there
is, in fact, no premium capture, an ordinance
may nonetheless be struck down because it fails for some other
reason substantially

to advance

a legitimate

state interest.

Even if our decision in Richardson was right, I believe
that the majority is wrong to expand it beyond the category of cases in which the existence
of the premium
capture is essentially
beyond dispute. I believe that in
expanding
the holding of Richardson, the majority's
opinion undermines
or even contradicts
the Supreme Court's
decisions in ordinary rent control cases such as Pennell
and Bowles v. Willingham, as well as threatens its decisions
in price control cases such as FCC v. Florida Power and the
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases.

II
If the majority

confined

itself to Richardson, it would

not be able to apply the "substantially
advances a legitimate state interest" test to the facts of this case. Under the
suggested
analysis in Yee, and as I read Richardson, the
prerequisite
to the application
of that test is that there be
a clear capture of the premium
resulting
from the rent
control ordinance.
Because there is no clear showing
in

App.
this case that

the premium

sees, the prerequisite
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will be captured

for applying

by the les-

the test does not exist.

The factual foundation
in this case is provided by a
lengthy Stipulation
of Facts filed in the district court.
Stipulations

26 and 27 state that Chevron

dealers

can sell

their dealerships
(and associated leaseholds),
and that the
selling price is not limited either by Chevron's
dealer
lease or supply
sale is subject

contracts or by Act 257. However, such a
to two conditions.
First, Stipulation
30

states that Chevron could object to the sale in "good
faith," as that term is defined by Hawaii Revised Statute
§ 486H-1: "The petroleum
distributor
shall not impose on
a gasoline dealer by contract, rule, or regulation, whether
written or oral, any standard
of conduct that is not reasonable and of material significance to the franchise
tionship."
It is not clear from the materials available

relato us

whether Chevron
would be acting in good faith within
this definition
if it allowed a dealer to sell a dealership
and leasehold only on condition
that the premium resulting from Act 257 be passed on to the new dealer in
calculating
the sale price. Stipulation
34 suggests
that
such a condition
might be in good faith: "The existing
dealer at the time of the enactment of Act 257 may be able
to sell his leasehold
value of the dealer's

at a premium
that derives from the
leasehold interest, given the reduced

rent imposed by Act, assuming that Chevron does not
object in good faith when the selling dealer seeks Chevron's consent to the assignment."
Second, Stipulation
26
states that Chevron
may require
the payment
of an
unspecified
"transfer
sale of a dealership.

fee" as a condition of permitting
the
It is not clear from the materials

App.
before

us whether

premium

resulting

such
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a transfer

fee could

include

the

from Act 257.

Further, Act 257 only limits the amount of rent Chevron can charge its lessee-dealers.
Chevron derives its
revenue
from them not only through
rent, but also
through the wholesale price for gasoline. Stipulation
15
states that Chevron requires its dealers, as a condition of
their lease, to purchase
Chevron-branded
gasoline
directly from Chevron. Stipulation
17 states, "Chevron
recovers its expenses
and investment
costs of lessee
dealer stations
(e.g., ground-lease
rent, real property
taxes, ordinary maintenance,
and depreciation)
in Hawaii
and throughout
the United States through two principal
revenue streams - rental revenue and earnings on Chevron gasoline sold through
the stations."
Stipulation
9
states, "Under a supply contract, the lessee-dealer
markets Chevron motor fuels, which the lessee dealer buys
from Chevron, at a price unilaterally determined by Chevron.
Chevron does not enter into a dealer lease unless the
dealer simultaneously
Chevron" (emphasis

executes
added).

a supply

contract

with

It is thus entirely within Chevron's
power to prevent
its lessee-dealers
from capturing
any premium
resulting
from Act 257. Chevron may have that power pursuant
to
its ability to object in good faith to a sale or to impose a
transfer fee. Chevron certainly has that power pursuant
to its ability unilaterally
to increase the wholesale
price of
the gasoline to its dealers. Indeed, the district court specifically discussed Chevron's ability to charge more for its
gasoline and thereby to capture the premium:
"Defendant's expert fails to explain why the oil company would
not increase the wholesale
price to simply offset the

App.
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in rent ....

Neither
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Defendants

expert have offered any reason
and even likely, result."
I recognize

that the district

nor Defendants'

why this is not a feasible,

court also stated

that "the

Act...
allows incumbent dealers to capture the value of
the decreased
rent in the form of a premium,"
but the
court made the statement
to show why the Act was not
likely to achieve its purpose of lowering
retail gasoline
prices rather than to justify the application
of the "substantially advances a legitimate
state interest" test. The
question under Richardson is not whether the terms of the
Act themselves
allow - i.e., do not prohibit - capture of
the premium;
rather, the question
is whether
the Act
creates a situation
where we know the premium
will, in
fact, be captured.
As the district court noted, the "feasible, even likely; result" is that Chevron
will take that
premium for itself in the form of higher
charged to its dealers.

wholesale

prices

III
I fear that under the maiority opinion virtually
all
rent control laws in the Ninth Circuit are now subject to
the "substantially
advances
a legitimate
state interest"
test, and that this test may invalidate
many of these laws.
I will not undertake
an extended analysis of the economic
and social effects of rent control laws. Suffice it to say
that the virtually
unanimous
opinion
of economists
is
that, except in unusual
and short-lived
circumstances,
they often do not achieve their stated purposes.
They
result in the creation
of large and unwieldy
bureaucracies. They do not subsidize
the truly needy - the
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homeless and those in public housing; rather, they subsidize those already able to pay for their own housing,
including many who can easily pay an open market price.
They interfere with the normal play of free market forces,
thereby creating incentives that result in reduced supplies
of housing, reduced maintenance
and repairs on existing
housing,
increased
housing
code
violations,
and
increased
transportation
inefficiencies
when tenants
change schools or jobs but remain in rent-controlled
housing.
The question
before the judiciary
is not the
advisability
of rent control laws but rather their constitutionality. Ever since its retreat from economic substantive
due process at the end of the 1930s, the Supreme Court
has essentially left it to the other branches of government
to decide, in their political wisdom, whether to adopt rent
and price controls. The Supreme Court's hints in Pennell
and Yee may signal a willingness
to rethink this long-ago
retreat, but at this point the Court has not yet done so.
I am not sure whether,
in Richardson, we properly
interpreted
the Court's hints in Yee in concluding
that the
"substantially
advances a legitimate
state interest"
test
used in zoning and land use regulation
cases should have
been applied to the rent control ordinance in that case. I
am inclined to think that we did not. I am sure, however,
that the majority
current law.

in this case extends

Richardson beyond

IV
It is not clear that Hawaii's
capture

of a premium

Act 257 will result

representing

a one-time

in the
wealth
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transfer to dealers currently
leasing stations from Chevron. Thus, even assuming that Richardson is good law, Act
257 should not be analyzed
under the "substantially
advances a legitimate
state interest"
test. Rather, Act 257
should be analyzed
under the reasonableness
test applicable to ordinary
rent and price control laws. While I
agree with the majority
that the summary
judgment
granted to Chevron should be reversed, I disagree with
the majority about the district court's task on remand. In
my view, the district court should apply the reasonableness test applied - until today - to ordinary
rent and
price control laws.

App.
IN THE UNITED
FOR THE
CHEVRON
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STATES
DISTRICT

DISTRICT

COURT

OF HAWAII

INC.,

CIV. NO.

Plaintiff,

97-0933

ACK

VS.

BENJAMIN
J.
CAYETANO, ET AL.,
• Defendants.

ORDER

RE: MOTIONS

FOR SUMMARY
SYNOPSIS

(Filed Nov.
The Court

is mindful

10, 1998)

of the strongly

the legislature
that Hawaii's
much for gasoline. However,

JUDGMENT

felt concerns

of

consumers
are paying too
the Court finds that Act 257

as crafted fails to substantially
further this legitimate
state interest,
and therefore
effects an unconstitutional
taking. _ Section
oil company
dealers
similar

3(c) of Act 257, which

may charge

limits

its lessee dealers,

rents that an
fails to benefit

and consumers
for two principal
reasons. First,
to the condominium
tenants under the rent con-

trol ordinance

declared

unconstitutional

City and County of Honolulu, incumbent

in Richardson v.
dealers

are able to

i The Court notes the State of Hawaii has now pursued
other means to rectify these concerns by filing suit against
gasoline wholesalers in Hawaii, alleging, inter alia, they have
engaged in price fixing.
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capture the value of reduced rent in the form of a premium upon sale of their leaseholds,
and consequently,
incoming lessee dealers are not benefitted
by the Act. 124
E3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 1998 WL 313049
(Oct. 5, 1998), and cert. denied, 1998 WL 407121 (Oct. 5,
1998). 2 Second, since oil companies can offset rent reductions by increasing
unilaterally
negate
and consumers.

wholesale
gasoline
prices, they can
any benefit to be realized by dealers

BACKGROUND
On June 21, 1997, the Hawaii

Legislature,

prompted

by concerns regarding
the relatively high price of gasoline charged to Hawaii consumers,
enacted
Act 257 of
the Hawaii Revised Statutes. Act 257, inter alia, implements

restrictions

on gasoline

manufacturers

in dealing with their retail dealers.
3(c) of Act 257 ("the Act") restricts
rent an oil company
a service station.

may charge

and jobbers

Specifically,
the amount

a lessee

dealer

In response
to the enactment
of the
Chevron brought
suit against Defendants

Section
of lease
for use of

Act, Plaintiff
Benjamin J.

Cayetano, Governor
of the State of Hawaii, and Margery
S. Bronster,
Attorney
General
of the State of Hawaii,
challenging
Section 3 of the Act as effecting an unconstitutional
taking of Chevron's property
in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments
of the United
2 The Court notes that Act 257 was enacted before the Ninth
Circuit Court issued its decision in Richardson.
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States Constitution.
nent part:

Section

3 of the Act reads,

in perti-

(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined
in section 486H-1, existing on August 1, 1997, or
entered
into thereafter,
shall be construed
in
conformity with the following:
(1) Such renewal [of the lessee-dealer's
leasehold] shall not be scheduled
more frequently
than once every three years; and
(2) Upon renewal [of the leasehold],
the lease
rent payable shall not exceed fifteen percent of
the gross sales, except for gasoline, which shall
not exceed fifteen percent of the gross profit of
product,
excluding
all related
taxes by the
dealer operated
retail service station as defined
in section 486H-1 and 486H-plus, in the case of a
retail service station
at a location
where the
manufacturer
or jobber is the lessee and not the
owner of the ground lease, a percentage increase
equal to any increase which the manufacturer
or
jobber is required to pay the lessor under the
ground
lease for the service station. For the
purpose
of this subsection,
"gross amount"
means all monetary
earnings of the dealer from
a dealer operated retail service station after all
applicable
taxes, excluding
income taxes, are
paid. The provisions
of this subsection
shall not
apply to any existing contracts that may be in
conflict with its provisions.
(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a
dealer from selling a retail service station in any
manner.
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 486H-10.4

(1997).
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On January 28, 1998, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its Second Claim for Relief. On
July 30, 1998, Defendants
responded
and filed a cross
motion for summary judgment
on all claims in Plaintiff's
complaint.
On August
19, 1998, and August
28, 1998,
Plaintiff and Defendants
each filed their respective replies. The Court heard oral arguments
on September 8,
1998. Both parties agreed that this case should be decided
one way or the other

SUMMARY

on summary

JUDGMENT

judgment.

STANDARD

Summary
judgment
shall be granted where there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
entitled
to judgment
as a matter of law. Fed. R. Cir. P.
56(c). One of the principal
purposes
of the summary
judgment
procedure
is to identify
and dispose of factually unsupported
claims and defenses. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrelt, 477 U.S 317, 323 (1986).
The United States Supreme
Court has declared that
summary judgment
must be granted against a party who
fails to demonstrate
facts to establish an element essential
to his case where that party will bear the burden of proof
of that essential element at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322. "If the party moving
for summary
judgment
meets
its initial burden of identifying
for the court the portions
of the materials
on file that it believes demonstrate
the
absence

of any genuine

issue

of material

fact [citations

omitted], the nonmoving
party may not rely on the mere
allegations
in the pleadings
in order to preclude
summary judgment."
T.W. Elec. Serv. v. Paczfic Elec. Contractors
Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Rather, Rule 56(e) requires that the nonmoving
party
set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56,
specific facts showing
that there is a genuine
issue for
trial. See ZW. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. At least some
"significant
probative
evidence
tending
to support
the
complaint"
must be produced.
Id. Legal memoranda
and
oral argument
are not evidence and do not create issues
of fact capable of defeating

an otherwise

summary judgment.
See British Airways
585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978).

valid

motion

for

Bd. v. Boeing Co.,

The standard
for a grant of summary
judgment
reflects the standard
governing
the grant of a directed
verdict. See Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of North America, 815 F.2d
1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986)). Thus, the question
is
whether "reasonable
minds could differ as to the import
of the evidence."
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250-51.
The Ninth Circuit has established
can it be argued that any disagreement

that "[n]o longer
about a material

issue of fact precludes
the use of summary
judgment."
California Architectural Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan
Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). Moreover, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that
"[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under
Rule 56(c), its opponent
must do more
that there is some metaphysical
doubt

than simply show
as to the material

facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
Indeed, "if the factual context makes the nonmoving
party's claim implausible, that party must come forward
with more persuasive
evidence than would otherwise be
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necessary

to show

that there

is a genuine

issue

for trial."

Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d at 1468 (emphasis
in original) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587). Of course, all
evidence and inferences
to be drawn therefrom
must be
construed
in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving
party. See T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630-31.
DISCUSSION
I.

Ripeness

tiff's

Initially,
takings

the Court must determine
claim is ripe. As the Ninth

Richardson, there are two hurdles
claim brought in federal court:

whether
PlainCircuit noted in

to a regulatory

taking

The first hurdle, . . . that the plaintiff obtain a
final decision
regarding
the application
of the
regulation
to the property
at issue from the
entity charged with implementing
the regulation . . . does not apply to facial regulatory
takings claims .... The first hurdle thus does not
apply to [Plaintiff'sJ
argument.
The second

hurdle

stems from the Fifth Amend-

ment's proviso
that only takings without
'just
compensation'
infringe
that Amendment;
'if a
State provides
adequate
procedure
for seeking
just compensation,
the property
owner cannot
claim a violation
of the Just Compensation
clause until it has used the procedure
and been
denied just compensation.'
Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1165. Because Chevron's
argument
that Act 257 does not substantially
advance a legitimate
state interest does not depend upon the extent to which
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Chevron is compensated,
claim is ripe.

II.

The "i'akin6s
The Takings

United

States

taking

of the Fifth Amendment

of the

Clause
Clause

from "regulatory
a governmental

states:

"IN]or

for public use, without
Amend. V. The United

has consistently

occupation

regulatory

Constitution

property be taken
tion." U.S. Const.,
Court

its facial

distinguished

shall

private

just compensaStates Supreme

"physical

takings"

takings." A physical taking occurs when
entity authorizes
a permanent
physical

of real property.

See Yee v. City of Escondido,

503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992). By contrast, the regulatory
taking
issue typically arises when a government
regulation,
such
as a zoning regulation
or a rent control Ia_% affects a
property

owner's

ability

to use his land.

See id. In the

words of Justice Holmes, "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized
as a taking."
Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
The Court notes that it is well established
that legislative acts come to the Court with a presumption
of
constitutionality,
see Concrete Pipe & Products of California,
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,
637 (1993); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978); Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976), and therefore
Plaintiff

faces an uphill

battle

in its challenge

to Act 257.

App.
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Facial Challense

When a party alleges that an act of the legislature
effects an unconstitutional
taking, they may bring either a
"facial"
challenge
or an "as applied"
challenge.
The
Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that a land use regulation will be found
to effect a taking if it does not
substantially
advance a legitimate
state interest or denies
the landowner
economically
viable use of his land. See
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also,
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016
(1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
The relevant inquiry in a facial challenge is whether
"mere enactment"
of the challenged
regulation
effects a
taking. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. For example, in Agins,
the city of Tiburon adopted
zoning ordinances
that limited development
of appellant's
five-acre lot to a maximum of five single-family
residences. Appellants
brought
suit against the city, alleging that the ordinances
prohibited all development
of their land and thus effected a
taking of their property.
The California
Supreme
Court
rejected appellants'
request
for a declaration
that the
zoning ordinances
were facially unconstitutional,
holding
that the terms of the challenged
ordinances
allowed the
appellants
to construct
between one and five residences
on their property.
See id. at 262.
The Supreme

Court

granted

certiorari,

and held that

the ordinances
substantially
advanced
legitimate
governmental goals. See id. at 261. In reaching this decision, the
Court considered
the benefits of the ordinances
as well as
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any diminution
in market value that the appellants
might
suffer. The Court also considered
appellants"
allegations
that they wished to develop the land for residential purposes, that the land was the most expensive
suburban
property in the State, and that the best possible use of the
land was residential,
and held that although
the ordinances limited development,
they neither prevented
the
best use of appellants'
land or extinguished
a fundamental attribute of ownership.
The Court further held that the
general plan advanced
a legitimate
state interest - protection from urbanization.
Finally, the Court noted that the
ordinance did not impose a burden solely on one landowner, it affected development
generally,
and therefore
the public did not benefit at the expense of a few. See id.
Similarly, in Richardson, the plaintiff brought a facial
challenge to a rent control ordinance that placed a cap on
renegotiated
ground rent that could be charged
by the
owner of the land under condominium
units. See 124 F.3d
at 1163. The Ninth Circuit first considered
the typical
condominium
ground lease scheme, noting that since the
land underneath
condominiums
is ordinarily
owned by
someone other than the condominium
owner-occupant,
the condominium
owner must lease the ground underneath the unit for long periods. The court went on to find
that although these leases are initially fixed for a term of
years, the rent is subject to renegotiation
which typically
is based on a percentage
of the fair market _'alue of the
land appurtenant
as of the date

to the unit, exclusive
of the renegotiation.

of improvements,
Finally, the court

recognized
that the ordinance
at issue was enacted
because the rapid rise in Hawaiian land prices often
resulted
in renegotiated
rents several
hundred
times

App.
greater
Circuit
that

52

than the initial fixed rent. Nonetheless,
the Ninth
declared
the ordinance
facially invalid, holding

the absence

of a mechanism

to prevent

owner-occu-

pants from capturing
a premium upon the resale of their
unit meant that the ordinance
would not substantially
further
1166.

its goal of creating

In the instant

affordable

case, Plaintiff

housing.

brings

See id. at

a facial challenge

to Act 257, arguing that the rent cap provision
of the Act
effects an unconstitutional
taking because it fails to substantially advance a legitimate
Plaintiff with no economically
B.

Applicable
Analysis

Defendants

argue

Standard
that

state interest and it leaves
viable use of its land.
in

Resulatory

Takings

Act 257 does not effect

a tak-

ing, and is therefore constitutional.
Moreover, Defendants
claim that Plaintiff
is applying
the wrong standard
in
evaluating
the state interest portion of the takings analysis.
According
constitutional

to Defendants,
in order for the Act to pass
muster,
it is not necessary
that the Act

actually further
the state interest
involved,
but merely
that the Legislature
rationally
could have believed
that
the Act would do so. In support of this argument,
Defendants cite Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984). However,
Midkiff dealt with a physical
taking,
rather than a regulatqory
taking, and is thus distinguishable from the present case. See id. at 233. In the physical
taking context,
the government
exercises
its eminent
domain power to take" private property
for "public use."
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Furthermore,
once the government
decides to physically
take property,
it must provide
just compensation
to the
person from whom the property
was taken. At issue in
Midkiff was the propriety
of the purported
"public use"
advanced by the government
to justify the taking. See id.
at 235. The Midkiff Court held that the only requirement
in a physical taking, since the taking is fully compensated,
is that the legislature
"rationally
could have
believed"
the taking
use." See id. at 242.

would

serve

the purported

"public

By contrast, the present case deals not with a physical taking, but with whether
there has been a regulatory
taking, an inquiry which requires a different
analysis. In
the regulatory
taking context, the inquiry is not whether
property
has been taken for a public
use, but rather,
whether
or not a government
regulation
substantially
advances a legitimate state interest. As clarified in Hall v.
City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 940 (1988):
In [Midkiff], the Court explored
the meaning
of
the public use requirement
in the Fifth Amendment's eminent domain clause ....
The Court in
Midkiff did not address
the somewhat
different
articulation
of the standard applicable
in cases
where there was no deliberate
exercise of the
eminent domain power. For example, it did not
mention Agins v. City of Tiburon . . . where it had
noted that "the application
of a general zoning
law to a particular
property
effects a taking if
the ordinance
does not substantially
advance
legitimate state interests ....
"The MidkiffCourt
left open the possibility
that less deference
would be afforded where government
does not
intend to effect a taking than where it does ....
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It makes considerable
sense to give greater deference to the legislature where it deliberately
resorts to its eminent domain power than where
it may have stumbled into exercising it through
actions that incidentally
result in a taking.
Id. at 1280. The United

States

Supreme

Court

echoed

this

viewpoint
in Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825, 835 (1987), when it stated:
We have required
that the regulation
[in the
takings
context]
"substantially
advance"
the
"legitimate
state interest" sought to be achieved,
not that "the state could rationally
have
decided"
that the measure
adopted
might
achieve the State's objective.
Id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit's
opinion
in Richardson, a
case discussed by both parties in the instant case, further
clarified this concept:
The language used throughout
Midkiff indicates
that deference
to the legislative
body's
public
use determination
is required when the taking is
fully compensated
....
[W]e believe that NollanLucas-Dolan
trio does not signal a change from
this longstanding
rule of deference
because we
see nothing inconsistent
in applying heightened
scrutiny when the taking is uncompensated,
and
a more deferential
standard
when the taking is
fully compensated.
124 F.3d at 1158. Thus,
determine

whether

the Court

finds

that,

the Act effects a taking,

ate inquiry is whether the Act substantially
legitimate
state interest, not merely whether
ture rationally
believed
it would do so.

in order

to

the appropriadvances a
the legisla-

App.
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of a Legitimate

State

Interest

The United States Supreme Court has not elaborated
on the standards
for determining
what constitutes
a
"legitimate
state interest"
or what type of connection
between a regulation
and the state interest satisfies the
requirement
that the former "substantially
advance"
the
latter. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834. However,
the Court has
made clear that a broad range of governmental
and regulations
satisfies these requirements.
1.

State Interests

purposes
See id.

to be Advanced

Before determining
whether
a legitimate
state interest is advanced by the Act, it is necessary to ascertain the
specific state interests involved.
Plaintiff argues that the
purpose of Act 257 is to provide
protection
for service
station lessee dealers. Defendants,
however,
assert that
Act 257 is designed to protect consumers
from the harmful effects of the highly concentrated
petroleum
market in
Hawaii.
Defendants'

contention

is not without

merit,

for on

its face, Act 257 appears to be directed toward the protection of consumers. Section 1 of Act 257 reads, in pertinent
part:
(1) The petroleum industry is an essential element of Hawaii's economy
and is therefore of
vital importance
to the health and welfare of all
people in the State of Hawaii; , . .
(4) Because Hawaii is a physically small and
geographically
remote economy, certain of its
markets tend to be concentrated.
Market concentration
is a function of the number of firms
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in the market
and their respective
market
shares. In a highly concentrated
market, market
prices tend to rise above competitive
levels.
Market prices persistently above competitive levels
are harmful to consumers and the public. Barriers to
competition
tend to cause supracompetitive
prices to persist; and
(5) The markets
for oil and
Hawaii are highly concentrated
Haw.

oil products
markets.

Rev. Star. § 257 (1997) (emphasis
However,

a closer

examination

in

added).
of Act 257, speci-

fically its legislative
history, reveals
another
interest,
namely "to provide certain protection for dealer operated
retail service stations."
Conf, Comm. Rep. 38, H.B. No.
1451 (1997).
While these two interests appear to be distinct from
one another, they do not conflict. A thorough analysis of
Defendants'
argument
reveals that in order to further the
state's interest of protecting
consumers,
it is first necessary to help lessee dealers, whose viability might lead to
a less concentrated
- and thus more consumer friendlymarket. Thus, the Court finds that while the legislature
was mindful of the need to protect lessee dealers,
this
consideration
was essentially a step toward the ultimate
goal of reducing gasoline prices for Hawaii's consumers)
3 Even if the ultimate goal of the legislature was to help
lessee dealers, Act 257 would still fail to substantially advance
its purpose. As discussed below, incumbent lessee dealers can
capture the value of the reduced rent in the form of a premium,
thereby depriving incoming lessee dealers of the benefit of the
rent cap. Similarly, oil companies can offset any decrease in rent

App.
Having ascertained
Act 257, the Court's
not these interests
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the state interests to be advanced
next task is to determine
whether
are substantially

Advancement

of State

by
or

advanced.

Interests

In support
of its motion for partial summary
judgment, Plaintiff argues that the Act fails to substantially
advance a legitimate
state interest. The Court agrees with
Plaintiff, on two principal grounds.

a.

New

Dealers

are Not Protected

Because

Incumbent
Dealers
Can Capture
the
Value of the Reduced Rent in the Form
of a Premium
Defendants
argue that the savings
realized
from
reduced rent under the Act will lead to the continued
business viability of independent
dealers, keeping them
in the market. They further argue that this, in turn, will
lead to a less concentrated
market,
more choices and lowering retail
increased competition.

giving consumers
prices by way of

Plaintiff argues, and the Court agrees, that the rent
cap provision of the Act fails to protect new lessee
dealers because it allows incumbent
dealers to capture
the value of the decreased rent in the form of a premium.
The existence
of the rent cap makes an independent
with an increase in wholesale prices, and thereby eliminate
benefit to the lessee dealer.

the
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dealer's

leasehold

interest

able, and this added value
when an incumbent dealer

in a service

station

more valu-

becomes especially significant
undertakes
to sell his interest.

See Stipulation
of Facts, 19 34, 35 at 10-11. Since the Act
does not prohibit an incumbent
dealer from selling his or
her service station lease, the rent cap provision
enables
these dealers to sell their stations at a premium.
See id. at
19 28, 29. Because the dealer to whom the interest is
transferred
will be required
to pay the premium,
the
overall expense incurred
by the incoming
lessee dealer
remains the same, and as a result, there are no savings to
pass along to consumers.
In support
of this argument,
the Court finds Richardson, 124 E3d at 1150, controlling.
In Richardson, the
Ninth Circuit addressed
a rent control ordinance
that
placed a cap on renegotiated
ground
rent that could be
charged by the owner of the land under condominium
units. The ordinance
was enacted for the purpose of
providing
affordable
housing
to owner-occupants.
Id. at
1165. The trustees of the Bishop Estate, owner of the fee
simple title to the land underneath
condominiums
that
were affected by the ordinance,
brought
an action contesting the constitutionality
of the ordinance.
Since the
owner-occupant
of a condominium
was free to transfer
his or her "rent-controlled"
leasehold
interest, the owneroccupant was able to capture the value of that rent cap in
the form of a premium.
Id. at 1164. The ordinance
was
challenged
by the plaintiff as an unconstitutional
taking.
The Ninth

Circuit

affirmed

the district

court's

finding

that the ordinance effected a regulatory
taking. According
to the Ninth Circuit, since the ordinance
did not provide
a mechanism

to prevent

the lessees

from

capturing

the

App.
premium,

the state interest
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in providing

affordable

hous-

ing was not substantially
advanced,
as ultimately
the
price of housing would remain the same. ld. at 1166.
Like Richardson, the possibility

of a sales premium

in

the case at bar prevents
the state interests
from being
substantially
advanced.
Act 257 fails to provide a mechanism to prevent dealers from capturing
a premium,
Indeed, cases like Yee and Hall suggest
that it is inappropriate,
if not unconstitutional,
to fail to provide
a
mechanism
in rent control legislation
to preclude
the
capture of a premium. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 527-31; Hall, 833
F.2d at 1279-80. Moreover,

the potential

for a premium

in

the present case is even more compelling
than that in
Richardson, since it is likely that a lessee dealer will find it
easier to part with his or her business, than would a
homeowner
with his or her home. Presumabl3;
a homeowner wishes to remain where he or she lives, whereas a
businessperson
is likely to view maximization
of profits
as the ultimate business goal. Thus, because an independent dealer can unilaterally
negate any benefit a transferee might receive from the Act, it fails to substantially
advance
the state's interest in protecting
new dealers.
Defendants
argue that Richardson is distinguishable
from the present case because the purpose of Ordinance
91-96, which was at issue in Richardson, and the purpose
of Act 257 are distinct. The primary
goal of Ordinance
91-96 was to provide affordable housing for owner-occupants of condominiums
subject to ground
leases. The
"Findings
and Purpose"
section of Ordinance
91-96
states, in relevant part:
)
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finds
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that:

(3)
. .
owner-occupants
of condominium[s] . . . were not informed
. . . of lease rent
renegotiation
. . . terms . . . of the lease, [which
are] established
unilaterally
by the lessors ....
;
(5)
. . . Unless controlled,
the renegotiated
lease rents may be unaffordable
to many owneroccupants
of leased
condominium
housing
units . . . ;
(6)
... owner-occupants
may have no recourse
but to terminate their leases or sell..,
and seek
housing

elsewhere

. . . ;

(7)(E) Residential leaseholds have also undesirable social effects . . . [because] as the lessee
advances in age, [the] lessee's income potential
declines, . . . causing the lessee to give up the
lease . . . ;

The council

further

finds and declares:

(3)
. . . lease rent increases of 1,000 percent
would make home ownership
unaffordable
to a
substantial
number of owner-occupants
of residential condominiums
....
Honolulu City and County, Haw. Ordinance
Defendants
argue that unlike the ordinance
Richardson, which
was enacted
to provide

91-96 § 1.
at issue in
affordable

housing, the purpose of Act 257 is not to provide affordable gas station
purchases,
but rather, to benefit consumers. Thus, even if transferee
dealers are negatively

App.
impacted

by a premium,
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according

to Defendants,

incum-

bent dealers will still benefit from the rent cap and will
thus pass along their savings
to consumers,
who will
thereby benefit as well. The Court disagrees.
First of all, in Richardson, although
the owner-occupants who retained
their condominiums
would clearly
receive a direct benefit from the rent cap each month, the
Ninth Circuit nonetheless
declared the Ordinance
unconstitutional

because

it failed

to prevent

owners

of condo-

miniums from capturing a premium upon the sale of their
units, thereby depriving
the purchasers
of any benefit
from the rent cap and resulting in the price of housing
ultimately remaining the same. Moreover, while it is possible that some lessee dealers may benefit from the Act's
rent cap in the form of lower overall costs, there is no
reason to conclude that such dealers will react to this
savings by lowering
their retail prices. Dealers may
instead elect to maintain
a higher profit margin, since the
Act includes
no mechanism
to pre,:ent
lessee dealers
from simply keeping their prices the same and retaining
the profit from the reduced rent on a month-to-month
basis. Nothing

has been

presented

to the contrary. 4

4 The parties agree that under current conditions, Act 257's
rent cap will only affect 11 of Chevron's 64 lessee dealer stations
in Hawaii. See Stipulation of Facts, _ 6 at 4. Thus, less than 20
percent of Chevron's stations will be impacted by the rent cap.
No evidence has been presented as to how the Act affects the
remaining non-Chevron stations.
The Court nonetheless
finds that Act 257 fails to
substantially advance a legitimate state interest, because it is
probable that consumers will not benefit from the rent cap as
applied to these remaining stations. First, it is possible that, like
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Dealers
Are
Reductions

By Wholesale
Defendants

also

sion of the Act helps
viability,
consumer
lowered

the

market

more

argue

that

incumbent
will

choices.

concentration

Price

They
means

lower retail prices. The Court
Act will lead to such a result.

Increases

since

the

dealers

be less

Not Protected
Can Be Offset

rent

go

on

finds

provi-

to maintain

concentrated,

more

cap

to argue

competition
it unlikely

giving

their
the

that

this

and

thus

that

the

53 of Chevron's
lessee dealer stations, the Act will not impact
these other stations at all. If this is the case, then the Act will
certainly
not benefit consumers,
since prices at these stations
will remain unchanged.
Second, even if the Act were to impact
these stations,
there is no mechanism
to prevent
incumbent
dealers
from capturing
a premium
upon the sale of their
stations, as discussed
at length above. Therefore,
under either
scenario,
Act 257 does not substantially
advance
the state's
interest
in benefitting
consumers.
Furthermore,
even in the
absence of a captured
premium, the Act still fails to advance its
purpose.
As discussed
infra, and as acknowledged
by the
government,
Chevron can merely offset the decreased
rent by
increasing
their gasoline prices, thereby negating any benefit to
be achieved by the Act. The Court finds no reason why other oil
companies
would
not act likewise.
In light
of these
considerations,
it is highly unlikely that the minimal number of
dealers
who might be benefitted
by the Act would make a
competitive
impact if they were to lower their prices.
Finally, the fact that Act 257 allows Chevron
to charge
approximately
$1.1 million more than it would otherwise have
charged under its own rental program further demonstrates
the
Act's ineffectiveness
in its purpose of protecting
consumers.
See
Stipulation
of Facts, Table 1.
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There
is no dispute
that Plaintiff
receives
income
dealers
in the form of both rent and fuel sales.

Importantly,
price

the Act does

of fuel

sales.

prices

to compensate

result,

dealers

will

not place

Thus,

an

any limitation

oil company

for the reduction
not

receive

any

can
in rent,

benefit

on the

raise

fuel

and

as a

the

rent

from

cap. $
Defendants
free to raise
they

will

not

argue
fuel
do

that

prices

although

to offset

so. s Defendants'

oil companies

any

reduction

expert

states

are

in rent,
that

an

s In fact, Defendants
have acknowledged
this possibility
their brief. Defendants'
brief reads, in relevant part:

in

In contrast,
Chevron's
lessee dealer
gas stations
provide
Chevron
with two sources
of revenue.
Chevron uses both to pay the expenses
it incurs in
leasing the service stations.
The first source is the
contract rent that is subject to Act 257. The second
source of rever_ue is from the sale of Chevron gasoline
to lessee dealers
which
lessees
are required
to
purchase from Chevron under the supply agreement
Chevron requires of the dealer lessees. The revenue
which Chevron
receives
from its gasoline
sales is
substantially
greater than the contract rent. Act 257
does not impose a cap on the amount Chevron may
charge for gasoline
and other products
it sells its
lessee dealers. Therefore,
Act 257 does not deprive
Chevron
of the ability to increase
the DTW price,
Chevron's
primary
revenue
stream
from its lessee
stations, in the event of an increase in costs.
See Def.'s Mot. for Summ.J.,

p. 28-29 (citations

omitted).

6 Plaintiff's expert disagrees.
It is evident from Plaintiff's
expert's declaration
that this can and will occur in response to a
reduction
in rent. See Declaration
of John R. Umbeck,
p. 3,
5(b); p. 8, '1 16; p. 11, _ 21. According to Plaintiff's expert, Act
257 will (1) penalize
Chevron and its lessee dealers, reducing
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increase in wholesale
would lead the dealer

fuel prices by an oil company
to increase his retail fuel prices.

This increased
retail price, according
to Defendants,
would result in a decreased volume of fuel sales, which
would

ultimately

hurt

the oil company.

However,

Defen-

dants' expert fails to explain why the oil company would
not increase the wholesale
price to simply offset the
decrease in rent. 7 Indeed, there is no economic reason
why a shift from paying a certain sum as "rent" to paying
that same sum as "fuel price" would lead a dealer to react
by raising his gas prices when his overall costs remain
the same. By doing so, he would be acting against his
own interest, running the risk of decreased sales because
of the increased
prices. Instead,
it is likely that if a
dealer's overall costs remain the same, he will choose to
remain competitive
by keeping his retail prices the same.
Because oil companies
can simply raise their wholesale
prices to the same extent that rent decreases, the dealer is
likely to be unaffected
by the rent cap, and gas prices will

their viability in Hawaii; (2) penalize consumers because it can
be expected to lead to higher retail gasoline prices; (3) not
benefit future lessee dealers because dealers can capture the
value of the rent cap in the form of a premium; and (4) not
permit Chevron to earn a reasonable return on its investments.
See id. at p. 3, _ 5. By contrast, Defendants' expert claims that
Act 257 will (1) benefit
consumers
by decreasing
the
concentration in the gasoline market; (2) benefit both incumbent
and transferee dealers; and (3) provide Chevron a reasonable
return on its investment. See Declaration of Keith B. Leffler, p.
4-5, _ 7.
7 Neither Defendants nor Defendants' expert have offered
any reason why this is not a feasible, and even likely, result.
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remain unchanged. 8 Consequentl3, _ the Act's purpose
of
protecting
the dealer - and thereby protecting
the consumer - would not be met.
Since Chevron's

Dealer

Supply

Contract

allows

a les-

see dealer to purchase
fuel from suppliers
other than
Chevron, one might argue that if Chevron were to offset
the decreased
rent as described
above, a dealer would
simply "go elsewhere"
to purchase his fuel. However, the
Court finds that this is neither a feasible nor practical
alternative.
First, the terms of the Dealer Supply Contract
state that a lessee dealer must purchase from Chevron all
fuel that is necessary
to fulfill customer
demand
for
Chevron gasoline. Thus, even if a dealer wishes to discontinue Chevron
gasoline
and sell another
brand, he
may not do so if a demand
for Chevron gasoline exists.
Second,
chooses

according
to market

to the Dealer Lease, if a lessee dealer
and sell other gasoline, he must install

his own pumps and tanks, and he must make it clear to
consumers
that the fuel contained
therein is not Chevron
fuel. As stipulated
to by the parties, there are only two
local refinery sources: Chevron, which supplies sixty percent of the gasoline produced
or refined in Hawaii,
and
Tesoro, which supplies
forty percent. See Stipulation
of
Although Defendants might argue that an oil company
may not be able to accurately assess the amount of increase in
wholesale price needed to offset the decrease in rental income,
the parties agree that, where an economic benefit or loss is
difficult to quantify, on average, the participants will estimate
accurately. See Declaration of Keith B. I.effler, p. 11-12, 't 16
(discussing accuracy of estimating value of rent cap in order to
calculate premium); Declaration of JohnR. Umbeck, p. 12, _ 22; p.
13, _ 24 (discussing estimation of rent cap value).

App.
Facts, _ 38 at 11. Therefore,
gasoJine from
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if a dealer

chose

another
source, it would
some sort of "concerted

to obtain

be cost-prohibaction,"
since

importing
gasoline requires purchasing
a large quantity
and chartering a vessel to transport it. Because this is not
a realistic alternative,
the Court finds that a lessee
dealer's

mere

ability

does not negate

to purchase

the probability

fuel from other

sources

that an oil company

such

as Chevron and Tesoro could be successful
in defeating
the rent cap by offsetting
decreased
rent with increased
fuel prices.
For all of the reasons
that Section
legitimate

outlined

above,

the Court

3(c) of Act 257 fails to substantially
state

interest,

and

as such,

effects

finds

advance

a

an uncon-

stitutional
taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments
of the Constitution.9,
_0

9 While the Court recognizes that Plaintiff brings a facial
challenge: to Act 257, the Court notes that Act 257 has been in
operation since June of 1997, and yet the state claims in its
lawsuit filed on October 1, 1998, which alleges antitrust
violations, that the price of gasoline for consumers is an average
of $.30 per gallon higher than prices on the mainland. This
further illustrates the ineffectiveness of Act 257 in its purpose of
benefitting consumers. However, the Court has not considered
the foregoing in reaching its decision.
10 Plaintiff
also challenges
the Act as effecting
an
unconstitutional
taking on two alternate grounds: (1) that it
leaves them with no economically viable use of their land, and
(2) that the Act falls to provide for individualized consideration.
Because the Court finds that the Act fails to substantially
advance a legitimate state interest, it need not address these
alternate arguments.
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Claims

Plaintiff moved for partial
on its Second Claim for Relief,
for summary

judgment

summary
judgment
only
while Defendants
moved

on all claims.

Defendants

failed to

satisfy their burden on Plaintiff's
First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief, because they
did not present any
there is no genuine

evidence which demonstrates
that
issue of material
fact as to those

claims. This is particularly
true with regard to Plaintiff's
First Claim for Relief (Deprivation
of Constitutional
Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) and Fifth Claim
for Relief (impermissible
taking in violation of the Hawaii
Constitution),
inasmuch
as the Court finds that Act 257
effects an unconstitutional
judgment
on those claims

taking. Accordingly,
is DENIED.

summary

In their brief, Defendants
represented
that Plaintiff
"announced"
that it would
not pursue its due process
and equal protection claims. However, the Court does not
find anything in the record which indicates that Plaintiff
abandoned
these claims. If it can be established
that
Plaintiff

did

make

such

a withdrawal,

Defendants

entitled
to summary
judgment
on the
Sixth, and Seventh Claims for Relief.

Third,

are

Fourth,

CONCLUSION
The Court finds that Act 257 fails to substantially
advance a legitimate
state interest, and as such, effects an
unconstitutional
taking in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
For the foregoing

reasons,

the Court

hereby

GRANTS

App.
Plaintiff's
motion
Claim for Relief.
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for summary

judgment

on its Second

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

Honolulu,

Hawaii,
/s/

NOV

10 1998.

Alan C. Kay
Chief United States
District Judge
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHEVRON
Pennsylvania

USA, INC., a
Corporation,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

No. 99-15108

v.

D.C.No.

BENJAMIN J. CAYETANO,
Governor of the State of
Hawaii; EARL I. ANZAI*,
Attorney General of the
State of Hawaii,

CV-97-00933-ACK
ORDER
(Filed

Oct. 28, 2000)

Defendants-Appellants.

Before:

D.W.

Circuit

Judges.

NELSON,

BEEZFR,

and

W. FLETCHER,

The majority of the panel has voted unanimously
to
deny the petition for rehearing. Judge W. Fletcher voted
to grant the petition for rehearing. Judges D. Nelson and
Beezer recommend
denying the petition for rehearing en
banc. Judge W. Fletcher votes to grant the petition for
rehearing en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion
for
rehearing en banc and no judge in active service has
requested
a vote to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.
App. P. 35.

Earl I. Anzai is substituted for his predecessor Margery
S. Bronster, as Attorney General for the State of Hawaii. Fed. R.
App. P. 43/c_,(2).
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The petitions
DENIED.

for rehearing
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and rehearing

en banc are
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHEVRON
Pennsylvania

USA, INC., a
Corporation,

No. 99-15108

Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.
CV-97-00933-ACK

V.

BENJAMIN J. CAYETANO,
Governor of the State of
Hawaii; EARL I. ANZAI',
Attorney General of the
State of Hawaii,

AMENDED
(Filed

ORDER

Oct. 31, 2000)

Defendants-Appellants.

Before:
D.W. NELSON,
Circuit Judges.

BEEZER,

and

W. FLETCHER,

The majority
of the panel has voted to deny the
petition for rehearing.
Judge W. Fletcher voted to grant
the petition for rehearing.
Judges D. Nelson and Beezer
recommended
denying the petition for rehearing en banc.
Judge W. Fletcher votes to grant the petition for rehearing
en banc.
The full court has been advised of the suggestion
for
rehearing
en banc and no judge in active service has
requested a vote to rehear the matter en banc. Fed. R.
App.

P. 35.

Earl I. Anzai is substituted for his predecessor Margery
S, Bronster, as Attorney General for the State of Hawaii. Fed. R.
App. P. 43(c)(2).
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The petitionsforrehearingand rehearingen banc are
DENIED.

App.
STATUTE
Hawaii Revised Statutes,
vides in pertinent part:
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INVOLVED
Chapter.

486H-10.4

(1997), pro-

(c) All leases as part of a franchise as defined in
section 486H-1, existing
on August
1, 1997, or entered
into thereafter,
following:
(1)
frequently

shall be construed

Such renewal
than once

every

shall

in conformity

with

not be scheduled

three

years;

the

more

and

(2) Upon renewal,
the lease rent payable shall
not exceed fifteen percent of the gross sales, except for
gasoline,
which shall not exceed fifteen percent of the
gross profit of product, excluding 11 related taxes by the
dealer operated retail service station as defined in section
486H-1 and [this section] plus, in the case of a retail
service station at a location where the manufacturer
or
jobber is the lessee and not the owner of the ground lease,
a percentage
increase equal to any increase which the
manufacturer
or jobber is required
to pay the lessor
under the ground lease for the service station. For the
purpose

of this

subsection,

"gross

monetary earnings of the dealer
retail station after all applicable
taxes, are paid. The provisions
of
apply to any existing contracts
with its provisions.

amount"

means

all

from a dealer operated
taxes, excluding
income
this subsection shall not
that may be in conflict

(d) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a dealer
from selling a retail service station in any manner.

